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Abstract
Android’s security model utilizes a combination of low-level and high-level security
mechanisms, such as the user-based protection model, SELinux, and permission system,
to control access to system resources. However, this model has two limitations: First,
it does not apply the principle of least privilege (PoLP) among app’s components and,
second, it fails short in tracking transitive invocations. The first limitation introduces
the problem of malicious 3rd-party libraries, whereas the second limitation enables the
confused deputy attacks.
To address the problems caused by both limitations, we extended Android’s security
model with new security features borrowed from capability-based security model. Specif-
ically, we introduced capabilities into Android’s middleware with kernel support. The
goal is to come up with a functional prototype that enables different components of the
same app to run with different access rights on the high-level system services, respecting
the PoLP. Additionally, the prototype must provide a clear path to mitigate confused
deputy attacks targeting system services through channels that have deliberately exposed
by the deputies.
Along the line, we use the Binder framework, which is used for IPC in Android, as
the building block for creating and communicating capabilities of system services. We
also rely on kernel’s security guarantees to prevent forging capabilities. Additionally, we
employ Android’s permission model to reflect the dynamic high-level security decisions
made by end users in order to encode the correct access rights into issued capabilities. As
a result, we fulfill our goal without significantly increasing the attack surface or causing
a performance degrade. In fact, our design shows a performance gain in specific places.
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As Android devices are rapidly evolving in power and capacity, they are gradually
becoming an indispensable element in our lives. As of May 2017, Android has reached
2 billion monthly active devices globally [1]. Naturally, an open platform, with such a
huge population, would attract malicious developers who would search every corner for
an exploit to launch attacks endangering security and privacy of this great mass.
The current security model of Android aggravates the problem as it fails short to
apply the principle of least privilege among app’s components. In other words, each
component running inside an app, would have the exact same privilege as any other.
This opens the door for the infamous problem of malicious 3rd-party libraries which
announce specific functionalities (and, thus, get included in apps) but perform other
undeclared malicious operations misusing the power given to them.
Another shortcoming of the current security model of Android is its inability to
track transitive invocations. In other words, the system would serve requests based on
the identity of the last caller. This disregards the fact that the request might have been
originated by an entity other than the last caller, which might not have the required
privilege to access the resource. This opens the door for the confused deputy and collude
attacks.
For both limitations, researchers have been introducing several novel techniques that
vary from being application-level or platform-level solutions. However, we believe we can
contribute to the solution by extending the current security model with new security
concepts which are borrowed from another security model, namely, object capabilities.
1
2 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.2 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 Technical Background and Problem
Statement, we start by introducing Android’s architecture and the security features
contributing to its security model. Then we elaborate on the Binder framework which
represents the building block of our design. We end the chapter by the problem statement
that illustrates, in details, the problem we are trying to solve in this work. In Chapter
3 Related Work, we present a brief introduction about capabilities and then present
Capsicum project, which brings capabilities into UNIX systems. In Chapter 4 Design
and Implementation, we present the details of our design and discuss its limitations. We
also show some stats on type and amount of changes introduced by our implementation.
In Chapter 5 Security Analysis, we discuss how we can employ the security features
provided by our design in leveraging system’s security. In Chapter 6 Discussion and
Evaluation, we evaluate our design against stock and discuss whether it is possible for
SELinux provide the same advantages of capabilities. In Chapter 7 Future Work, we
present our ideas on how to improve our design and address about open issues. We




In this chapter, we present the technical background that paves the way for introducing
our design. We begin by presenting Android’s platform and discussing the cornerstones
of Android’s security model. Then, we elaborate, in details, on the Binder framework,
which forms the building block of our design. Based on the presented knowledge, we end
the chapter by stating the problem we are addressing in this work.
2.1 Android platform
Figure 2.1 shows a high-level view of Android platform [6], which is also known as
Android’s software stack. At the very bottom of the stack, we find a modified Linux
kernel which, in addition to the conventional functionalities of any UNIX kernel, provides
special drivers for GPS, camera, audio, Bluetooth, graphics, among others. The most
important driver for this work is the Binder, which enables an efficient inter-process
communication (IPC).
On top of the kernel, there is the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL). This layer
acts as a bridge between kernel space and user space. HAL provides interfaces for the
kernel drivers, called HAL modules, which must be implemented by hardware vendors.
The contract on how these interfaces are invoked by user space processes is well-defined.
However, the underlying implementation could differ from one device to another.
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Figure 2.1: Android’s Software Stack
In Android, each app runs in its own process with a private instance of Android
Runtime (ART). The ART is responsible for translating the Dalvik Executable (DEX)1
bytecode into machine code. DEX files result from compiling Android apps (which are
written in Java) using build toolchains, such as Jack [10]. Android Runtime includes
Java and Android core libraries, such as packages of java.*, javax.*, and android.*. These
libraries provide most of the functionalities of the Java programming language (such
as string handling, files management, and networking) in addition to the libraries that
are specific for Android development (such as the libraries used for building interfaces,
accessing hardware, and sharing data among apps).
Next, we see the native C and C++ libraries which are used heavily by HAL modules
and ART. Some functionalities of these native libraries are exposed to the application
framework using Java Native Interface (JNI). Examples of these functionalities are:
Creating internet sockets, accessing files [19], storing persistent data in relational SQLite
databases, compressing data, and rendering 2D/3D graphics.
The application framework provides APIs to a wide range of system services. Develop-
ers rely on these services to enrich their apps with complex functionalities, such as access
to location, camera, sensors, and telephony services. The application framework also
provides APIs that enable apps to access data stored by the system (such as contacts, and
1In Android 5.0, ART came as a replacement for Dalvik virtual machine. Nevertheless, the abbreviation
DEX still refers to Dalvik.
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calendar entries) and data stored by other apps as a form of data sharing between apps
via what is called ”Content Providers”. It worth noting that the application framework
implements a considerable amount of its functionalities in native code and accesses it
through JNI.
At the very top of Android’s software stack, we find system and 3rd-party apps.
Examples of system apps are the Settings (for modifying and viewing settings of system
and installed apps, changing permissions of apps, among other functionalities), Contacts
(which uses the contacts provider to perform CRUD operations on the contacts address
book), and Dialer (for making and receiving phone calls). Users can install 3rd-party
apps from Google Play and arbitrary other sources. Each app has a manifest file called
AndroidManifest.xml that defines app’s behavior and capabilities. App developers can
compile C/C++ code into static libraries and include them into app’s package, e.g., using
Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK). As mentioned earlier, these libraries can then
be accessed from Java code using JNI.
Android apps are composed of four basic components, which are:
• Activities: The user interface which users can interact with.
• Services: Components that execute long-running operations in the background.
A service provides the means for other apps to bind with it in order to use its
exported methods.
• Content Providers: Implement a mechanism for apps to share data among each
other using SQLite-like interfaces.
• Broadcast Receivers: Resemble mailboxes for broadcast Intent2 messages.
It worth noting that all app processes are forked from a process called Zygote [5].
Zygote is a pre-warmed process that includes common framework code and resources but
not the operational code of the apps. After Zygote forks an app’s process, it loads app’s
code into the process and starts it. As a consequence, all processes forked from Zygote
share the memory blocks allocated for framework code and resources. This technique is
meant for speeding up the launch time of apps and optimizing memory usage.
Finally, we should mention that the complete Android’s software stack resides in two
projects: Android Open Source Project (AOSP) [7] and the Goldfish kernel project [17].
For all discussions and code tracing throughout this thesis, we use AOSP of
version 7.1.2 r33 (code name Nougat or N for short) and Goldfish of version
3.4 as references (unless stated otherwise).
2An intent describes an operation to be performed against components of self and other apps. For
example, it is used to start activities, send broadcasts, and start or bind with services.
6 Chapter 2 Technical Background and Problem Statement
Figure 2.2: Direct/Indirect Access of Kernel Resources
2.1.1 System Services
As shown in Figure 2.2, Android provides several kernel resources that can be accessed
by Android apps to perform specific functionalities, such as retrieving GPS coordinates,
downloading data from the internet, and capturing audio and video. Based on the form
of access, these resources are divided into two main categories:
• Resources Accessed Directly: Android apps can access this type of resources
either by issuing direct system calls from app’s native code or by invoking high-level
APIs from the application framework3. In either case, it is the app’s process that
issues the system calls. Examples of this type of resources are files, internet sockets,
and Bluetooth sockets4 [21][14][15].
• Resources Accessed Indirectly: Android comes with two highly-privileged
processes called system server and mediaserver [9]. Both processes expose some of
the low-level functionalities to be invoked by apps over IPC. Similar functionalities
are wrapped in what is called a ”System Service”. Although the system server
3The application framework uses native code of its own to issue system calls to the corresponding
kernel modules. For example, an app uses the File.java from the application framework to open a file,
referenced by its full path. The call passes through different classes and layers until it eventually reaches
libcore io Posix.cpp [19] which issues a system call that opens a file and returns its file descriptor. This
native library can also be used to create IPv6 and IPv4 sockets.
4There have been some efforts in bypassing the official Bluetooth APIs provided by the application
framework to access Bluetooth functionalities from native code. Supported by the fact that Android
maps Bluetooth permissions into groups (more on this later in this chapter), we believe this resource
falls into both categories and therefore, can be accessed directly and indirectly.
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manages its own drivers (see the drivers colored with the light blue in the Figure
2.2), both system server and mediaserver processes use another level of indirection
to have access to more kernel drivers. For example, the mediaserver instructs
the cameraserver process to obtain video frames from the camera device (through
an HAL module) and return the frames in a buffer queue [11]. Moreover, the
system server communicates with rild (Radio Interface Layer daemon) over local
sockets to query information about the telephony services, register listeners for
changes on phone state, among other functionalities. The introduction of system
services reduces the programming effort on app developers who can access the
low-level functionalities through high-level APIs from the Java code.
By introducing system services, the kernel has to authorize a bounded number of
processes to access its resources in comparison to what would have been the case if each
app’s process would access the kernel resources itself. This significantly reduces the
management overhead caused by the enforcement of access control in the kernel. However,
to preserve stability of the system, the system server, mediaserver, and other processes
that host system services have to authorize apps which invoke their functionalities,
resembling the access control as it would have been enforced by the kernel. In turn,
the kernel would authorize these processes. Although most of the access control logic
is moved to the middleware, the kernel would still have to authorize apps when they
attempt to access the resources exposed directly to them, such as accesses to files and
internet sockets.
In Android, the list of system services gets longer with each release5. As of Android
7.1.2, the number of all system services is about 1156. However, about 83 of the total
number of system services are exposed to app developers [4] while the rest is meant to
be used internally by the Android framework.
App developers can access most system services in a unified fashion. Specifically,
developers use the getSystemService(String name) API from app’s context [8] to retrieve
a manager for the remote system service that is referenced by the name supplied to
the call. Developers then invoke methods of the manager. In turn, the manager passes
the request to the remote system service over IPC. Based on the sensitivity of invoked
method, the system service checks authorization of the caller process, executes the desired
method if the request is legit (e.g., process is authorized and parameters are as expected),
and return a result, if any.
5It worth noting that different Android vendors can also add more system services than what exists
in the AOSP.
6This information was retrieved by running the shell command: adb shell service list against the
default Android emulator of AOSP. It worth noting that some services cannot be emulated, e.g., the
bluetooth service [20], and therefore they do not appear in the service list.
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Examples of the services that can be retrieved by 3rd-party apps are: Activity-
ManagerService (AMS), LocationManagerService (LMS), WifiService, CameraService,
PowerManagerService, and WindowManagerService. Some system services, such as the
PackageManagerService (PMS), require to be bound to the app’s context and, therefore,
they should be retrieved using other API, namely, getPackageManager() from app’s
context.
Android enables app developers to create their own services and expose them to
other apps. Those services are called bounded services. Although both system and
bounded services use IPC, the mechanics on how apps connect to bounded services (from
middleware perspective) is different from how apps retrieve handles (connect) to system
services. What makes system services really special is the fact that they are registered
with a component called the Context Manager (process name is servicemanager). As we
will discuss later in Subsection 2.3.1 Context Manager, this technique is used to expose
system services to apps and other middleware processes.
2.2 Android’s Security Model
There are several technologies that contribute to the security model of Android, some of
which are directly inherited from the Linux kernel (e.g., user-based model, SELinux7,
virtual memory, ASLR, and DEP) while others have been introduced and adapted
specifically for Android (e.g., Android’s permission system and Binder framework for
IPC). All of these technologies aim to provide storage and memory isolation, mitigate
software exploitations, control access to resources, allow for secure and efficient IPC,
among other goals.
In this section, we limit the discussion to application sandboxing, a technique that
is used to limit the capabilities of the environment in which a process is executing,
and Android’s permission system, that is used to control access beyond boundaries of
sandboxes. We dedicate Section 2.3: Binder Framework for a detailed discussion on the
Binder framework for its importance to our work.
2.2.1 Application Sandboxing
In Android, users install arbitrary 3rd-party apps which might contain bugs, security
vulnerabilities, and malware. To prevent malicious apps from sabotaging other apps and
the host system, Android utilizes the user-based protection model to lay the ground rules
7The user-based model and SELinux enforce Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory
Access Control (MAC), accordingly.
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for application sandboxing and uses SELinux to further limit the capabilities of each
sandbox. As a result, each app would run in a restricted environment with a limited set
of resources and confined access rights on these resources.
Although it is called ”application” sandboxing, the techniques discussed here are
also applied to all processes in the system, including middleware processes (system server
and mediaserver), daemons (rild), and some other highly-privileged processes, such as
Zygote. This is crucial to mitigate attacks targeting the system through these processes.
2.2.1.1 User-Based Model
Traditional Linux systems rely on the user-based protection model, which enforces
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), to support multiple users, where each physical user
is assigned a unique user ID (UID). Such systems assume that different users should not
trust each other. Therefore, each UID is allocated a subset of the resources in the system.
Processes that run under the same UID share the same resources assigned to it but
cannot, by default, access resources allocated to other users. Android takes advantage
of this model and implements sandboxing, unconventionally, by assigning each app a
unique UID at app’s installation time. As a result, processes of different apps would run
with isolation of each other on two levels:
• Resource Isolation: Each app has its own private storage that can be accessed
only by its processes. Moreover, processes are prevented from accessing most of
the system services and kernel resources. For example, an app’s process cannot, by
default, create internet sockets nor retrieve coordinates from the location service.
• Memory Isolation: When Zygote forks an app process, it assigns it the UID
of the owning sandbox. This guarantees memory protection for all app processes
because two processes of different sandboxes would be assigned unique UIDs.
It worth noting that Android supports multi-user feature where the user in this
context is called a profile. However, this feature is disabled, by default, and has to be
enabled by device manufacturers [12][46].
Android’s implementation of sandboxing allows multiple processes of the same app
to run under one sandbox8. Hence, they have access to the same resources. When
a sandboxed process fails or gets compromised, other processes running in the same
sandbox would be affected as they share the same resources. However, the effect remains
contained and does not propagate to outside processes.
8Two processes of different apps can share the same sandbox if their apps were signed by the same
signature [2], whereas processes of the same app run, by default, in the same sandbox.
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Following our discussion in Subsection 2.1.1 System Services, the kernel resources
that can directly be accessed by apps are assigned to app sandboxes using standard
Linux facilities, namely, the UID and group ID (GID). Examples of these resources are
the virtual file system and network sockets. To better understand how the kernel control
access to such resources, we discuss how an app is assigned, by default, a private directory
with read and write access rights on it.
When an app is installed, the package manager service instructs the installd daemon
over sockets [18] to create a directory for the newly installed app. As a consequence, a
directory with app’s package name is create under the directory ”/data/data/”. Files
stored in the new directory are private to the owner app. The Listing 2.1 shows the result
of stat command on a file named private file that is created and stored in a directory
assigned to an app with a package name ”com.test.app”. We can observe that this file is
owned by the user with UID of 10070 and its main group is also 10070 (line 4), which
happens to be the UID of the newly installed app with the package name ”com.test.app”.
The access rights allow the owner or processes that join the group 10070 to read and
write the file (660 access rights, line 4). However, other processes which are not the
owner nor has joined the specified group cannot perform any operation on the file.
When Zygote forks a process for the newly installed app, it sets the UID, main GID,
and supplementary GIDs of the process. The Listing 2.2 shows the status information of
app’s main process. We can see that this process is, in fact, the owner of the file (line
4). Therefore, it can read and write it. We can also see that it joins two supplementary
groups (line 7). The first group (9997 ) is given to all apps of the same profile while
the second group (50070 ) is shared across all profiles for the same app. The supple-
mentary groups reflects extra permissions assigned to the process. For example, if a
process has the 3003 group, then it is allowed to create IPv4 and IPv6 internet sockets [21].
1 # stat /data/data/com.test.app/files/private_file
2 File: ‘private_file ’
3 {...}
4 Access: (660/ -rw -rw ----) Uid: (10070/ u0_a70) Gid: (10070/ u0_a70)
5 {...}
Listing 2.1: File’s UID and GID
1 # cat /proc/{PID}/ status
2 Name: com.test.app
3 {...}
4 Uid: 10070 10070 10070 10070
5 Gid: 10070 10070 10070 10070
6 FDSize: 64
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7 Groups: 9997 50070
8 {...}
Listing 2.2: Process Status Information
2.2.1.2 Security-Enhanced Linux
Application sandboxing using DAC sets the foundations for storage and memory isolation.
However, DAC fails short to apply fine-granular permissions on resources. For example,
a process can either execute all functionalities of file or none based on wether the process
has the execute permission on the file or not, accordingly. Moreover, processes that run
under the same UID enjoy the same access rights on the resources allocated to them.
Thus, the problem of gaining full access to system’s resources boils down to exploiting
one vulnerable root process.
Integrating SELinux in Android enforces a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies
that confine access to files and network resources [26]. SELinux overcomes the limitations
of the DAC by defining policies for accessing resources at the level of a single operation.
The enforcement of policies enables privilege segregation across processes running under
the same UID. This means even root processes (processes that run under UID of 0 ) are
not equal in privilege [22]. In fact, the notion of users does not exist in SELinux. The
absence of a policy is interpreted as an access denial. Therefore, explicit policies must
be defined to cover all legit access scenarios. Using SELinux does not eliminate DAC.
Instead, both mechanisms complement each other as SELinux policies are checked after
DAC permits the access.
SELinux policies are static in the sense that when they are defined, they cannot
be changed. In Android, SELinux policies are compiled and shipped as a single binary
file that is used by the Linux Security Module (LSM) to regulate accesses to resources
(SELinux is implemented as part of the LSM framework). Adding a new policy requires
installing a new compiled policy file, which include the new policy, into the system. In
other words, a new ROM needs to be installed on the device to apply new policies.
LSM Hooks
The LSM hooks of SELinux are special security functions which are placed in kernel
and user space code where access control checks are needed. For example, LSM hooks
reside in Android middleware (e.g., service manager.c and DrmManagerService.cpp),
the kernel-level Binder driver (binder.c), among other critical places where operations
on files and socket, or accesses of resources of other processes are done. The LSM of
SELinux uses the security contexts of both subject and object along with the action to
decide whether to allow an operation or not (based on the defined policies).
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Security Contexts
SELinux relies on the concepts of subjects, objects, and actions. Subjects are processes
trying to perform actions on objects, whereas objects are resources managed by the
kernel such as files, sockets, and processes. Each subject and object must belong to
a security context. The security context is composed of four components: User, role,
type, and level. These four components enable Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
Multi-Level Access Control (MLS), and Type-Based enforcement (TE). For this thesis,
we only focus on TE as a mean for privilege confinement.
Type-Based Enforcement
Each subject and object must have a single type, which is defined in the associated security
context. Types must be created statically by the system administrator. Nonetheless, the
administrator can also define transition rules that define the new types of subjects and
objects based on a specific event, namely, executing a file. Another way of assigning
types is with forking as child processes inherit types of parents. Rules use types to define
access rights on resources. LSM makes sure that only accesses with defined policies are
permitted.
To better understand how SELinux is used to confine privileges of processes, we
consider the rules listed in Listing 2.3. In the first line, we see a rule that constitutes
that a process of type ”system server” can execute ”add” and ”find” functions from
an object of type system server service and of class service manager9. Based on the
policy, invoking another function (e.g., list) will fail. An LSM hook that enforces the first
rule would ideally be placed in the place where the service manager receives a request
from another process to add or find a service maintained by it. The LSM hook will
retrieve the security contexts of both parties and consult an entity, namely, the Security
Server, that can decide whether the request should be permitted or not. The second
Line shows another policy that defines what operations the process Zygote (that has a
type of zygote) can perform on a directory labeled with zygote. It worth noting that
labeling and assigning classes to subjects and objects happen when the system boots up.
The more defined rules imply more fine-grained access rights. However, that would
cause more overhead as policies are compiled into a single binary file. Although LSM
implements caching of policies to enhance performance, the number of policies is preferred
to be as minimal as possible.
1 allow system_server system_server_service:service_manager { add find };
2 allow zygote zygote : dir { ioctl read getattr lock search open } ;
9Android defines several object classes in system/sepolicy/security classes and defines the possible
operations on them in the file system/sepolicy/access vectors. Examples of these classes are file, socket,
dir, process, and service manager. The former class defines three operations: add, get, and list.
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Listing 2.3: SELinux Rules
Figure 2.3: Global Access Control Enforcement by DAC, MAC, and Permissions [29]
2.2.2 Android’s Permission System
As discussed in Subsection 2.1.1 System Services, Android has introduced system services
which manage several kernel resources. Apps have no other option but to go through these
system services to access the kernel resources managed by them. As a consequence, the
kernel has to authorize system services, conventionally, using UIDs and GIDs permissions
in addition to SELinux policies. In turn, the system services must authorize calling apps
using Android’s high-level permission system (see Figure 2.3). Along the line, the new
permission system comes with extra benefits:
• It grants the system more control on what functionalities can be exposed or hidden
to/from 3rd-party apps because the access control happens in the middleware which
has the high-level semantic that is missing in the kernel. For example, the system
prevents 3rd-party apps from adding new location providers while allowing system
apps to do so.
• This design enables dynamic permissions in the sense that apps can be granted
permissions while they are running without the need to restart them. This is one of
the advantages over the POSIX permissions that are enforced by GIDs and UIDs
which require the restart of the running app so the permissions become effective.
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Figure 2.4: Granting And Revoking Permissions
• The system uses the permission system to protect data accessible through content
providers. Such as contacts address book and calendar entries.
• It is generic enough to be used between apps. For example, an app can define a
permission and protect a service it provides.
In the new permission model, system services protect their methods by permissions,
which are unique strings that denote the ability to perform specific methods [33]. App
developers have to request permissions in order to invoke the protected methods of
system services. The decision on whether to grant, or revoke the permissions is placed in
the hands of the end users. If the end user denied the request of granting permission,
the app cannot trigger execution of the protected methods.
Permissions Management
Android keeps a database of all permissions granted or denied in the file /data/system/-
packages.xml. One of the many tasks provided by PMS is to maintain this file at runtime.
Whenever a permission is granted or denied, the package manager reflects the change
into this file. Permissions are stored in the database along with the package name and
the corresponding UID of the sandbox.
The package manager provides APIs to query wether a specific sandbox has a specific
permission or not. This is heavily used by system services to decide on whether to serve
or reject the incoming invocation.
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Requesting/Acquiring/Revoking Permissions
The app developer has to decide in prior what permissions are needed in her app so she
would request them in the AndroidManifest.xml file. Based on the permission type, the
end user will be asked either at the install time or at the runtime to grant the permission
to the app. Figure 2.4(a) shows a typical permission dialog asking to grant (App1) the
permission to access the location. Permissions can also be revoked using the Setting app,
see Figure 2.4(b).
Permission Levels
System and user-defined permissions can take one of the following protection levels [23]:
• Normal : They are of low-risk to the system, apps, and end user.
• Dangerous: They are sensitive in terms of security and privacy because they grant
the app access over user’s private data and device which, if put in wrong hands,
would cause severe impact on the user.
• Signature: This type of permissions is only granted if the requesting app is signed
with the same signature used to sign the app that defined the permission.
• signatureOrSystem: This type of permissions is similar to the signature. However,
it is also granted to applications that are in the Android system image.
Permission Types
Starting from Android 6 [24], permissions are divided into two types:
• Install permissions: This type of permission is granted at install time and cannot
be revoked. Install-time permissions include normal and signature permissions.
• Runtime permissions: In general, dangerous permissions are granted at runtime.
However, unlike install-time permissions, runtime permissions can be revoked using
the Settings system app.
User-Defined Permissions
Although it is out of our scope in this thesis, it worth noting that Android enables app
developers to define permissions in order to protect app’s components. For example,
the developer has the option to only allow the apps that have a specific user-defined
permission to start an activity of her app, bind with a service her app offers, send a
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broadcast which she creates a receiver for, or access a content provider her app maintains.
Permission Groups
Starting from Android 6 [24], all dangerous permissions belong to groups. These groups
are: CALENDAR, CAMERA, CONTACTS, LOCATION, MICROPHONE, PHONE,
SENSORS, SMS, and STORAGE. When an app requests a dangerous permission declared
in its manifest file, the system handles the request in two different ways depending on
whether the app is already granted a permission from the same group or not. First, if
the app is not granted a permission from the same group, then the user is prompt with
the permission dialog message. As shown in Figure 2.4(a), the permission group is stated
rather than the permission itself. Second, if the app is granted a permission from the
same group, the system grant the permission to the app silently without any interaction
with the user. This means, app developers would still have to declare all dangerous
permissions individually in the manifest file and end users grant and revoke permissions
per group.
Permission Enforcement
For the sake of relevance, we only discuss the permissions that are used to protect
functionalities of system services. This means we refrain from discussing the enforcement
of custom permissions defined by app developers and permissions that protect content
providers.
As mentioned earlier, each system service protects its sensitive methods with per-
missions. When a protected method is invoked, the service extracts the UID and
PID of the incoming request (which can be retrieved using Binder.getCallingUid() and
Binder.getCallingPid(), accordingly) and use them to query the PMS to decide if the
caller process has the required permission to access the desired method. In turn, the
PMS uses the UID of the caller process to locate its permissions and return PERMIS-
SION GRANTED if the required permission is granted or PERMISSION DENIED if it
is denied. The system service acts based on this information by either allowing method’s
execution (if permission is granted), or raising a SecurityException (if permission is
denied).
Listing 2.4, shows how LMS protects the getLastLocation() method. First, the
method gets the resolution level through getCallerAllowedResolutionLevel() which ex-
tracts caller’s PID and UID (lines 11-12) from the request and then passes the control
to getAllowedResolutionLevel() where the computation of the resolution level actually
happens. The former method computes the resolution level after consulting the PMS
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through service’s context (lines 16-17). The resolution level is then injected in checkRes-
olutionLevelIsSufficientForProviderUse() (line 5) which would raise a SecurityException
if the caller does not hold the required resolution to access the required provider.
1 public Location getLastLocation(LocationRequest request , String packageName) {
2 {...}







10 private int getCallerAllowedResolutionLevel () {




15 private int getAllowedResolutionLevel(int pid , int uid) {
16 if (mContext.checkPermission(android.Manifest.permission.






Listing 2.4: Reference Monitor In Wi-Fi Service
Although most permissions are enforced in similar fashion to what we have discussed
above, some permissions are enforced in other ways:
• As of Android 7.1.2, there are five permissions available to 3rd-party apps which are
mapped, when granted, to GIDs [14], and therefore enforced by DAC and MAC, as
discussed in Subsection 2.2.1 Application Sandboxing. Those permissions are listed
in Table 2.1. The first three permissions cannot be revoked once granted, while
the last two can be revoked using the settings app but require app to be restarted,
only if it was running [13].
• Another set of permissions, shown in Table 2.2, are enforced by the system when
it delivers broadcast Intent messages to apps that define these permissions and
implement broadcast receivers that matche specific actions. For example, the system
allows apps that define the normal permission RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED
and implement a receiver with action of android.intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED
to receive a broadcast when the system finishes booting.
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Table 2.1: Permissions Enforced By DAC and MAC
No. Permission Level
1 BLUETOOTH ADMIN normal
2 BLUETOOTH normal
3 INTERNET normal
4 READ EXTERNAL STORAGE dangerous
5 WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE dangerous
Table 2.2: Permissions That Protect Sensitive Broadcast Messages
No. Permission Level
1 RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED normal
2 PROCESS OUTGOING CALLS dangerous
3 RECEIVE SMS dangerous
4 RECEIVE WAP PUSH dangerous
5 RECEIVE MMS dangerous
2.3 Binder Framework
The process isolation is a desired feature in any operating system. However, processes
need to communicate, e.g., to exchange data and invoke operations from each other.
Communication across processes, or IPC, holds a higher significance in Android than
any other traditional system, considering the platform design choices, where services
and components are decoupled from each other for modularity and security reasons.
For example, unlike most applications running on traditional operating systems, the
simplest action of switching between two activities in Android, even within the same
app’s process, requires an IPC to another process, e.g., to let the AMS (which resides on
the system server process) handle the request.
Since Android uses a Linux kernel, it ideally supports all traditional IPC mechanisms
offered by the kernel, such as signals, shared memory, files, message queues, and sockets
[33]. Some of these mechanisms are used in Android. For example, system server uses
local sockets to communicate with the radio daemon, the mediaserver uses buffer queues
to receive video frames from the cameraserver [11], and apps can naively communicate
through public files. Nonetheless, Android relies heavily on another IPC mechanism that
is lightweight, secure, and enables synchronous remote10 procedure calls (RPC); this
mechanism is the Binder.
10The Binder does not support communications over the network and, therefore, ”remote” in this
context refers to services that run on other processes but within the system.
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Figure 2.5: Binder Framework
The Binder is a term that is used to describe the overall IPC architecture, and it
is a synonym for Binder framework. The core concept behind the Binder is inspired
from OpenBinder project by Be Inc and later Palm Inc. In fact, portions of OpenBinder
project was used in initial bringsup of Android [37]. However, the Binder framework,
as implemented in Android, is completely specific to Android and has been adapted,
extended, and integrated deeply into the platform. For example, Binder IPC is the
primary, IPC mechanism used between apps and system processes (such as system server
and servicemanager) and between the apps themselves [32]. Moreover, Android 8 (Oreo)
extends the Binder framework by introducing Binderized HALs which support Binder
IPC between Android framework and HALs [25][39].
As shown in Figure 2.5, the Binder framework consists of many components that
span over the kernel and the user space. In this section, we present those components and
elaborate on their roles. Throughout the discussion, we use client and server to denote
two processes, where the client wants to invoke an operation from a service offered by the
server. The server, in turn, handles the request and returns a result, if any, to the client.
Binder Driver
The Binder driver is the most pivotal component in the Binder framework. It serves
as a broker between any two communicating processes facilitating the client-server
communication model. All processes willing to communicate over Binder IPC have to
register IPC threads with the driver. Thus, the servers register worker IPC threads which
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block waiting for requests from clients to serve. The clients, on the other hand, register
IPC threads and use them afterward to initiate IPC requests to servers.
Assume a client wants to invoke an operation from a server, the flow of communication
goes as follow:
1. The client uses an IPC thread to issue an ioctl call to the driver. This system call
accepts a pointer to a data structure (called binder write read) as a parameter.
This data structure contains a reference to the transaction data stored in the
address space of client’s IPC thread. As shown in Listing 2.5, the transaction data
contains a handle to the target service (line 3), code of the target method to be
invoked (line 7), and a data buffer with control information (lines 11-19). The data
buffer holds method’s parameters wrapped in a special object called a parcel [47].
2. The driver handles the ioctl call coming from client’s IPC thread by saving client’s
thread information (to be used later on for returning the result) and copying
transaction data to the kernel space (using copy from user system call). To
associate the IPC request with the client, the driver injects client’s identity (UID
and PID) into the transaction data (lines 9-10). Using the handle of the remote
service (line 3), the driver identifies the target server, populates the transaction data
with specific information about the target service (lines 4 and 6), selects a thread
from server’s pool of available workers, and copies the transaction data (which,
now, carries client’s identity) to the address space of the selected thread (using
copy to user system call). Finally, the driver wakes up (unblocks) the selected
thread and passes it a reference to the transaction data stored in its address space.
3. The wakened thread reads transaction data from its address space, identifies the
target object that need to be invoked (using the information in line 6), retrieves
parameters and method information, and invokes the required method. If the IPC
is one-way (this information is encoded in line 8), the IPC transaction ends at this
point. However, if it is a two-way IPC, then the flow proceeds to the next, and
last, step.
4. The server’s thread issues an ioctl call to the driver and passes it a reference to
the result in its address space. The driver copies the result from the address space
of server’s thread to the address space of client’s thread that initiated the request
(which is blocked waiting for a result). The driver then wakes up client’s thread
and passes it a reference to the result in its address space. At this point, server’s
thread blocks again waiting for further requests to serve, while client’s thread is
free to issue new IPC requests.
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18 __u8 buf [8];
19 } data;
20 };
Listing 2.5: Transaction Data
It worth noting that the transaction data stored in the address space of server’s IPC
thread is actually stored in a private memory block called Thread Local Storage (TLS).
Each thread in Android has its TLS. The TLS guarantees that IPC threads, even those
which belong to the same process, would not overwrite transactions data of each other
[41].
Parcel
The parcel is a special container that is used to carry parameters between processes over
Binder IPC. If a client wants to send the string ”foo” to a server, the client has to create
a parcel object and call writeString(”foo”) on it. Then, Android framework serializes
parcel objects and attaches them into the transaction data. While handling the IPC
request, the Binder driver copies the serialized parcel object from client’s address space
to the server’s address space (as part of the transaction data). On the other side, the
server reconstructs the parcel and calls readString() to get ”foo”. Parcel class supports
all primitive types, such as int, string, float, and boolean, in addition to other complex
classes, such as IBinder, Serializable, and Parcelable.
Binder Object
The high-level services (written in Java) that need to be accessible over the Binder
framework have to extend a special java class, called Binder.java. Methods of this class
enable services to identify callers, e.g., through getCallingPid() and getCallingUid() which
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return the PID and the UID of the calling process, accordingly11. Additionally, this class
provides a default implementation of a very important method, namely, onTransact().
This method is triggered whenever the service receives an IPC request. Services have to
override this method to provide appropriate unmarshalling of transactions, more on this
in Subsection 2.3.1 Context Manager
The Java classes of system services, such as LocationManagerService.java, Package-
ManagerService.java, and WifiService.java, extend the Binder.java class. As discussed
earlier, these services, and more, are managed by the system server process which, while
booting up, creates an instance (Binder object) from each service class it manages and
register it with the Context Manager (CM) to expose it to other apps. More on this later
in the next section.
Each Binder object has a driver-level representation called Binder node (binder node,
see Listing 2.6). The Binder node contains information about the owning process (line 3)
and references to the Binder object in server’s address space (lines 5-6). When a server
creates a Binder object and communicates it through the Binder driver (e.g., to register it
with the CM), the driver creates a binder node entry and stores it in the Binder process
of the server.
1 struct binder_node {
2 {..}






Listing 2.6: Portions Of Binder Node Structure
Binder Handle
Binder handles are similar to file descriptors in UNIX systems. A handle is a key that
references a low-level data structure. This data structure references a resource, namely,
a Binder node. Binder handles are created and issued to user space processes (only upon
their demand) by the Binder driver. On an abstract level, the client that possesses a
Binder handle can use it to access an arbitrary operation from the remote Binder object
referenced by the handle. The Binder driver resolves the handle and locates the server
11This is possible while the service is handling the IPC request and within the scope of the service. If
these conditions are not met, the getCallingPid() getCallingUid() would return the PID and UID of the
service process [41].
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responsible for handling the request. The request is then forwarded to the server which
invokes the required operation on the Binder object.
The Binder handle, as viewed from the user space, is merely a 32-bit integer value
that is unique per process. However, Android framework builds an abstraction around
this Binder handle and the result is an object of type IBinder. This object can be used
to issue IPC requests to the remote service by calling its transact() method with the
required parameters (which are encoded into a parcel object) and the code of the target
method. When a transact method is called on an IBinder object, the Android framework
extracts the Binder handle from the IBinder object and injects it, along with method’s
code and the parcel that holds the method’s parameters, into the transaction data. Then,
the client uses an IPC thread to issue an ioctl call to the driver which, in turn, transfer
transaction data to server’s side.
From the perspective of the Binder driver, each Binder handle is associated with
a data structure that is called a Binder reference (binder ref, see Listing 2.7), which
contains information about the owner process (Line 3), the 32-bit handle value (Line 5),
and the target Binder node (Line 4).
1 struct binder_ref {
2 {...}
3 struct binder_proc *proc;




Listing 2.7: Portions of Binder Reference Structure
Binder Process
Each user space process involved in Binder IPC has a corresponding structure in the
Binder driver called Binder process (binder proc, see Listing 2.8). The Binder process
references the user space process by its PID (line 6) and maintains three red-black binary
trees for Binder references (line 5), Binder nodes (line 4), and IPC threads registered
with it (line 3). The tree of Binder references contains all the Binder handles a process
ever obtained, whereas the tree of Binder nodes references all Binder objects a process
ever created. This entails that a process can be both a client and a server at the same
time. In Subsection 2.3.1 Context Manager, we explore the relation between Binder
references, nodes, and processes in more details.
1 struct binder_proc {
2 {...}
3 struct rb_root threads;
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4 struct rb_root nodes;




Listing 2.8: Portions of Binder Process Structure
Figure 2.6: High-Level View on Proxy and Stub Classes
Proxies and Stubs
To abstract developers away from the low-level details on how Binder IPC transactions
are handled, Android introduced Proxy and Stub classes. Everything starts with the
remote service creating an interface that defines all of its remotely accessible methods.
Both the Proxy that resides on client’s side and the Stub that resides on server’s side
have to implement this interface.
The implementation of the Proxy marshals parameters of each method by encoding
them into a parcel object. Then for each method, the proxy invokes transact() API
(proxy classes extend IBinder class which provides a native implementation for this API).
The Stub has to override the onTransact() method to unmarshal the data of incoming
requests, by extracting parameters from the parcel, and then invoke the actual methods
that implement the business logic of the service.
To understand how Proxies and Stubs are used, we consider a high-level scenario
(depicted in Figure 2.6) in which an app uses the getSystemService() API to retrieve
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a hypothetical manager (e.g., FooManager) that establishes an IPC connection with a
hypothetical remote system service (e.g., FooService which exposes a single method).
The manager encloses a proxy inside it. The proxy encloses an IBinder object which
carries the handle value of the remote system service and offer the transact() method.
When the foo() method is invoked from the manager, the call is passed to the proxy
which creates a parcel object and inject method’s parameters in it. Then, the proxy calls
the transact() method with method’s code and data parcel as the first two parameters.
On server’s side, the request is received in onTransact(). Based based on method’s code,
the method extracts parameters and invoke the service which implements the required
business logic.
It worth noting that if the operation is two-way (requires a result), then the transact()
method blocks waiting for the result preventing the IPC thread from issuing other IPC
requests. Moreover, the method’s code passed in transact() (e.g., foo code) is number
which must be in sync between client and server. This number should be unique for each
method in the same interface.
2.3.1 Context Manager
The primary prerequisite for processes to reach system services over the Binder framework
is to possess Binder handles to them. For security and performance reasons, processes
are granted handles to remote system services only upon their request. One approach
to enable this design is to create a central unit that acts as a bookkeeper of system
services. Processes on the other hand, must invoke this central unit and ask explicitly to
be granted Binder handles to the desired system services. In Android, this central unit
is the Context Manager (CM) or alternatively called the Service Manager.
The CM is a native daemon process that starts very early in the boot process of
Android. While CM is booting up, it starts a loop with a handler function that listens
on incoming IPC requests from remote processes through the Binder driver. The handler
function supports a small set of commands, such as adding a service, getting a handle of
a service, listing all registered services, etc.
Before executing any command, the CM checks the authorization level associated
with the caller using SELinux and based on UIDs of callers. Depending on the result
of the check, the CM will either reject or allow the execution of the command. For
example, system processes (including system server, drmserver, surfaceflinger, etc.) can
add system services, whereas apps are explicitly prohibited from adding services; however,
they can get handles of registered services. Additionally, isolated processes (which run
26 Chapter 2 Technical Background and Problem Statement
using a range of special UIDs [21]) are prevented from retrieving Binder handles.
Accessing The Context Manager
Although handles of system services are obtained through the CM, the handle of the CM
service must be priorly known to all processes. While the CM is booting up, it instructs
the Binder driver, over an ioctl call, to register itself as the only CM in the system. The
Binder driver then creates a special Binder node, called binder context mgr node, which
holds a reference to the CM. Processes that need to invoke a function from the CM must
set the target handle in the transaction data to 0. When an IPC transaction with a
handle of 0 reaches the Binder driver, the driver uses the special Binder node of the CM
to retrieve a reference to the CM. Thus, the Binder driver passes the transaction to the
CM, which in turn handles the request. This is especially important for processes when
it comes to service registration and discovery, as processes can communicate with the
CM directly using its universally known handle value.
In a more detailed level, Binder processes start with an empty tree of Binder refer-
ences. In other words, a process starts with zero Binder handles in its possession. When
a client process makes its first call to the CM, e.g. to add or get a service, the Binder
driver queries the tree of Binder references for an entry with a handle of 0. Since the
CM has not been used before, no entry with a handle of 0 will be found. Therefore, the
Binder driver creates a new Binder reference that points at the Binder node of the CM,
sets its handle value to 0, and inserts it into the tree. This happens only once during the
life time of the caller process.
Registering System Services
As discussed in Subsection 2.1.1 System Services, system services are run and managed
by a handful of middleware processes. When those processes start, they register their
services in the CM. This serves as an announcement of their availability to be invoked
by apps. One of the most important processes that does so is the system server which is
the focus of the following discussion.
To understand how services are registered in the CM, we need to distinguish between
two data structures. The first one is the already known tree of Binder references that is
stored inside the Binder process in the driver. The second data structure is a linked list
that holds high-level information about services and stored in the user space of the CM
process. Each entry in the service list of the CM contains a handle value, a name, and
other control fields (see Figure 2.7).
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Figure 2.7: Registering System Services
When the system server is ready, it instantiates an object (Binder object) for each
service it manages. Then, for each Binder object, the system server initiates an IPC to
the CM. The transaction data will contain a Binder handle of value 0 (indicating that
the CM is the target process of this transaction). Additionally, it will include a memory
pointer to the Binder object, the name of the system service (and it should be unique
over all services registered in the CM), the command code for adding services in the CM,
among other data.
As shown in Figure 2.7, when transaction reaches the Binder driver, a new Binder
node for the Binder object is created. The driver then updates the Binder node to
reference the Binder object in the user space. The Binder node then gets inserted into
the tree of Binder nodes that is specific to Binder process of the system server (step 1©).
The CM must possess a Binder reference to the newly created Binder node. Thus, a new
Binder reference is created with a handle ”H” (step 2©). Since the Binder driver acts
merely as an intermediary and operations that require a high-level semantic should not
be implemented in it, the high-level information such as the name of the service must be
stored in the service list of the CM. Therefore, the Binder driver locates the CM and
passes the transaction, including the handle value ”H”, to it. If the service has not been
registered before, the CM creates a new entry in the list of services (step 3©). The entry
must include the handle value ”H” and the name of the service. We observe that handle
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values in the service list and the tree of Binder references of the Binder process of the
CM must be in sync to reference the right Binder node. Additionally, handle values of
system services must start from 1 as the 0-handle is reserved to the CM.
It worth noting that Android defines SELinux policies to control who can register
services into the CM and what services are allowed to be registered. Thus, only a few
processes are allowed to execute the command used for adding services in the CM. For
example, system server is the only process that can add the location service (and a bunch
of other services), whereas surfaceflinger is the only process allowed to add surfaceflinger
service. This security enforcement is essential, as untrusted processes cannot register
malicious services and trick other processes into using their services as if they were the
actual system services.
Retrieving Binder Handles
Clients that want to have access to system services have to go through the CM to
retrieve Binder handles for those services. App developers can use the high-level API
getSystemService() and pass it a name for the desired service. This API will take care of
invoking the CM with the correct transaction data.
When the IPC request arrives the Binder driver, it forwards the request to the CM,
which, in turn, searches its list of services for an entry with the desired name. If an entry
is found, the CM returns the Binder handle (H) that is associated with the found entry
to the driver. The driver searches the tree of Binder references of the CM for an entry
with a Binder handle of value (H). When the entry is found, the driver duplicates it,
assigns it a new handle value (the new handle value is calculated by adding one to the
last issued handle), and inserts it into the tree of Binder references of the Binder process
that belongs to the client. Finally, the driver returns the handle to the client.
Accessing Remote System Services
A client can access a system service if it possesses a valid Binder handle for it. The
mechanics on how the driver handles service invocation is identical to the flows discussed
earlier between clients/system server and the CM. However, we think it is important to
stress the point that system services can retrieve the UID and the PID of the calling
process through getCallingUid() and getCallingPid() static methods of the Binder class,
accordingly. Services use this information to check the permissions associated with each
caller.
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2.4 Problem Statement
In Android, processes and components of the same app share the same resources granted
to the sandbox they belong to. This model possesses a risk as one buggy or vulnerable
process/component could end up leaking sensitive information about the end user (e.g.,
leaking location, messages, and contacts) or performing unauthorized operations on her
behalf (e.g., dialing phones, sending SMS, and altering files). To understand the extent
of this problem, we consider the problem of 3rd-party libraries.
Nowadays, developers tend to rely heavily on 3rd-party libraries for app monetization,
analytics, gaming, or reducing programming effort. Such libraries would run with the
same privileges as of any other component in the sandbox. Given that such libraries
come from arbitrary sources, there is a high probability that some libraries would misuse
the power given to them, which in fact happens so frequently. Researchers [49][57] have
detected some ad. libraries that access more resources than they publicly announce to
developers and end users. Although several solutions have been proposed to address this
problem, we believe there is still room for improvement.
As Android seeks to find a balance between security and usability for Android’s
permission system, they have introduced the concept of groups. Specifically, each
dangerous permission must belong to a group. In turn, developers define the permissions
they need from those groups. The system would grant all defined permissions of a
group to an app if, at least, one member permission is explicitly granted by the user.
Apparently, this enhances usability because users would not bother to know the details
of each permission, and would not be confronted with security decisions now and then.
On the downside, this model aggravates the problem discussed above, causing apps to
live in overprivileged sandboxes (without user’s consent for most of it) which make them
attractive targets for exploitations by malicious 3rd-party libraries.
Another shortcoming of the current security model of Android is its inability to track
transitive invocations [30]. For example, when an app (A) invokes an interface (exposed
unintentionally or deliberately) by another app (B) which, in turn, invokes an operation
from a system service, the service will handle the request with the authority of app (B).
This disregards the fact the app (A) might not have the required privilege to execute
the operation itself. Malicious apps use this limitation to exploit unprotected (or poorly
protected) interfaces offered by privileged apps (called confused deputy). Users of apps
rely on app developers to protect their interfaces from being misused in such a way. In
turn, app developers define permissions and require other apps to hold those permissions
to be able to call their interfaces. This approach requires a high sense of security and
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well understanding of Android’s permissions system (which might not exist on some app
developers).
From what we have presented in this section, we can easily come to the conclusion
that the current security model of Android does not apply the principle of least privilege
among components of the same app, which constitutes that a component/process should
be given the least privilege required to achieve its functionality. In this work, we provide
a new approach for limiting privileges of 3rd-party apps on system services. We also
propose a new mechanism that enables app developers to easily protect their interfaces
that are deliberately exposed to other apps. Moreover, this work is moving towards
reducing the effect of ambient authority that causes several problems in Android, such
as the confused deputy.
Chapter 3
Related Work
In this section, we present a quick overview on object capabilities which serves as a
preamble for introducing a hybrid system, called Capsicum, that leverages DAC, MAC,
and capabilities to establish more confined sandboxes.
3.1 Object-Capabilities
A capability is a token that references an object and defines access rights on it [40], as
shown in Figure 3.1. A subject that possesses a capability is qualified to access the object
referenced by the capability. The access rights, associated with the capability, dictate
what operations can the subject perform on the object. For example, a subject that has
a capability to a file might be able to read it but not write it.
Each subject, e.g., user, process, or procedure, in a capability system is associated
with a list of capabilities. This list contains all the capabilities ever issued to the subject.
The system must protect the capability lists from being tampered with by any entity in
the system. This is necessary to prevent subjects from escalating their privileges, e.g., by
modifying the access rights or change the reference of the capability to access another
object. Only the OS [48][45], or the hardware [51], can modify entries of capability lists.
To use a capability, the subject has to pass the index (handle) of the capability in
an operation, e.g., WRITE(cap handle, data). The system then retrieves the capability
referenced by the handle cap handle and decides, using the capability’s access rights,
whether the operation WRITE is allowed on the object or not. We can easily observe
that the identity of the caller does not contribute to the decision. Thereby, capability
systems eliminate the effect of ambient authority.
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Processes can obtain capabilities through controlled channels with respect to the
principle of least privilege. For example, a process can receive a capability after calling
an OS routine. A capability can also be received by another process in the system (dele-
gation). The system allow more operations on capabilities such as deletion (revocation),
downgrading, and upgrading the access rights.
Finally, it worth noting that most modern operating systems provide implementations
that resemble capabilities. For example, file descriptors in UNIX systems are considered
capabilities. Each process has its own file descriptors list that is maintained by the OS.
However, none of those systems is designed to support operations on capabilities, such
as delegation, revocation, and access rights enforcement.
Figure 3.1: Capabilities and Objects
3.2 Capsicum: Capabilities in UNIX Systems
According to the authors of Capsicum project, Capsicum is a lightweight operating system
capability and sandbox framework which extends, rather than replacing, UNIX APIs,
providing new kernel primitives, namely, sandboxed capability mode and capabilities
[50].
The motive behind this project is that UNIX systems are poor in applying the
principle of least-privilege for running programs. The solution to this problem resides in
using capabilities which define way more fine-grained access control than conventional
UNIX systems. However, pure capability systems suffer from poor adoption, whereas
UNIX systems are widely deployed. Therefore, the pragmatic solution is to introduce
capabilities into UNIX systems as an extension forming a hybrid system that uses
DAC, MAC, and capabilities for access control. This approach preserves existing UNIX
APIs and performance, and presents application authors with an adoption path for
capability-oriented design.
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Capsicum extends UNIX file descriptors which possess some of the properties of
object-capabilities as described in the literature: they are unforgeable tokens of authority,
can be inherited by a child process, and passed between processes over IPC. Capsicum
provides an API, namely cap new, that takes a file descriptor and a mask of rights to
create a capability. Each capability would encode roughly 60 possible mask rights. Each
bit of this mask represents a permission, i.e., CAP READ, CAP SEEK, and CAP IOCTL.
Capsicum enables two modes of operation: the normal mode, and the capability
mode (which activated upon calling cap enter). In the capability mode, processes are
denied from accessing global namespaces (process IDs, sysctl, shm open for named shared
memory segments), in addition to other interfaces (i.e., /dev, ioctl, reboot and kldload).
Access to system calls in the capability mode is restricted. For example, system calls
that require access to global names spaces are prevented, while others (sysctl, openat,
unlinkat, renameat) are constrained so that they can only operate on objects relative
(but cannot contain ..) to the passed descriptor.
Upon invoking a system call on a capability, the kernel uses fget to retrieve the
struct of a file descriptor which extended to hold access rights of the capability. This
API serves as a single entry point for resolving file descriptors into references. Therefore,
all operations on capabilities are guaranteed to be checked for access rights first. If the
access rights allow the operation, then the execution will proceed. Otherwise, an error is
reported and the API call fails.
As a straightforward example, we illustrate how Capsicum is used to sandbox the
tcpdump application. The authors analyzed the program and found one system call,
namely pcap loop, that serves as a single entry point for processing packets from the
network. The authors applied two changes; First, they modified pcap loop to define the
access rights which the passed file descriptors should have, i.e., writing operation requires
CAP WRITE. Second, they modified the tcpdump itself to confine the capability (which
in fact is the file descriptor which pcap loop will work on) and strip away unnecessary
access rights from it before passing it to pcap loop. When pcap loop invokes a system
call on the capability, the system uses fget API to resolve the target desired operation and
required access rights. Then it retrieves the actual access rights the capability possess.
Finally, it compares the acquired access rights, set (A), against the required access rights,
set (B). If (A) is a subset of (B), then the access is allowed, and the execution proceeds,
otherwise, it is prevented.
This approach has also been applied to other more complex applications, such as




In this chapter, we introduce our design for supporting capabilities for system services
with kernel-level enforcement. The design extends the current security model with new
security features which are derived from capabilities as tokens of authority. Our goal is
to mitigate the effect of ambient authority and effectively apply the principle of least
privilege among app’s components which require access to system services.
The security and efficiency of the proposed design are tied to the technologies
presented in Chapter 2 Technical Background and Problem Statement. Specifically,
we use the Binder framework as the building block for creating and communicating
capabilities. We also rely on kernel’s security guarantees to prevent forging capabilities.
Additionally, we employ Android’s permission model to reflect the dynamic high-level
security decisions made by end users in order to encode the correct access rights into
issued capabilities for system services. As a result, we fulfill our goal without significantly
increasing the attack surface or causing a performance degrade.
We start the chapter by highlighting and justifying the key decisions which shaped
our design. Then, we introduce the ”big picture” that conveys the design and covers the
prerequisite knowledge required to understand the following sections. Afterwards, we dive
into the details related to the management of capabilities. Particularly, we discuss how
capabilities of system services are created, delegated, revoked, and used for invocation.
We end the chapter by talking about the different aspects of our implementation, such
as the size of changes, scope, and limitations.
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4.1 Design Decisions
As discussed in Section 2.3 Binder Framework, the Binder framework uses a distinguished
architecture that produces unforgeable and transferable tokens, called Binder handles
which are used as references to access Binder services. The unforgeability of Binder
handles is guaranteed by the kernel, namely, the Binder driver, which we assume to be
trusted and fortified against attacks. Although Binder handles are merely 32-bit integers
(as viewed from the user space), processes can only communicate them over the Binder
framework. Any attempt to transfer Binder handles over files, sockets, or any other
IPC mechanism will be meaningless as the Binder driver would not be able to resolve
the Binder handle when used for accessing Binder services. In other words, it is the
kernel-level data structures maintained by the Binder driver that enables the usage of
Binder handles as references.
All the aforementioned characteristics of Binder handles lead us to the realization
that a Binder handle is, in fact, a capability that entails two states: The process can either
access the Binder service or it cannot, based on either the process possesses a Binder
handle to the Binder service or not, accordingly. This binary state is very coarse-grained
in terms of access control. Therefore, for a Binder handle to be a fully fledged capability,
it needs to encode the access rights of the owning process for the target Binder service.
Most Binder services are protected by high-level permissions. The owner of the device
decides whether to grant an app, and transitively its processes, a specific permission or
not. We sought that it would be for the best that we re-use those permissions to encode
the access rights of the capabilities. The reason behind that is because we do not want
to re-invent the wheel. Instead, we aim to instrument the current technologies to refine
the access control mechanisms.
Following our discussion in Section 2.3 Binder Framework, system services are
exposed using the same mechanism, i.e., they are registered with the CM which acts as
a bookkeeper that processes must query to retrieve Binder handles to system services.
On the other hand, bounded services are not registered with the CM. Due to time and
effort limitations, we have decided to only support capabilities for system services and
use Android’s permissions to define the access rights of those capabilities. This decision
does not roll out the possibility of supporting capabilities for bounded services (using
user-defined permissions) because they all use the same technologies (e.g., Binder IPC
and PMS). However, the design we are proposing is centric around the fact that system
services are registered with the CM.
Moreover, other low-level resources which are accessed directly using system calls
(such as file system and internet sockets) or using different IPC mechanisms than the
Chapter 4 Design and Implementation 37
Binder IPC (such as local sockets and shared memory) are not considered for this work.
Protecting low-level resources with capabilities requires low-level drastic changes to
the system which need to be done carefully. Supporting capabilities for the high-level
resources, such as system services, using the Binder framework can be considered as a
complementary work to any effort for supporting low-level capabilities. Although it is
not yet ported to Android, Capsicum is the best candidate for enforcing capabilities on
low-level resources (see Chapter 7 Future Work).
In general, our design tends to borrow and reuse ideas from stock Android. For
example, we slightly extended the Parcel class and used bounded services to delegate
capabilities and revoke them afterward. In addition to reducing efforts, reusing and
slightly extending components to achieve our goal comes with some benifits. Specifically,
the proposed design keeps the attack surface almost intact and introduce unnoticeable
performance overhead at some places. This performance overhead is evened, or even
overcome, by performance gain at other places, later on this in Section 6.1 Performance
Analysis.
Finally, throughout the following discussions we use Binder handles and capa-
bilities interchangeably.
4.2 Big Picture
The goal of our design is to support capabilities for system services and provide a
functional prototype. To effectively achieve this goal, we have to fulfill the following
requirements:
• The system must be able to create capabilities for system services and delegate
them to processes, only upon their request. However, the system must preserve the
ability to upgrade and downgrade access rights of capabilities at runtime (this is
necessary to keep up with dynamic permissions already used in Android).
• The capabilities which are delegated by the system1 must encode the most up-to-
date permissions of the recipient processes at any time. This is fundemental to
prevent privilege escalation through capabilities.
• A process can have multiple capabilities that uniquely map to different system
services. The access rights of one capability must encode the high-level permissions
1A capability can be delegated by the system and the processes. For the second case, the process
that receives the delegated capability usually does not hold the permissions encoded in the capability.
Otherwise, it can request its own capability from the system.
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which are related to the system service referenced by this capability. For example,
only the permissions that are related to the WifiService are used to encode the
access rights of the capability issued for the wifi system service.
• A process must be able to use the capabilities it possesses as references to system
services in order to access their functionalities. A system service, in turn, must
be able to decode the access rights of the capability associated with the incoming
request to decide whether to allow or reject the request. The implementation of
this access control is solely based on the access right of the capability.
• Given capability’s characteristics presented in Section 3.1 Object Capabilities,
processes must be able to delegate capabilities to other processes to grant them a
restricted access to system services. Moreover, the design must enable processes to
revoke the capabilities delegated directly by them.
• As a good-to-have requirement, the design is preferred to provide the means for
applying policies that control who can delegate, whether a delegated capability can
be delegated again, and how the system should handle revocation of a delegated
capability that has been re-delegated to other processes.
Before presenting the abstract communication flows of our design, we present four
components that appear frequently throughout the discussion. Those components are:
Applications
Apps are active components that initiate all communication flows in our design. Processes
of apps should explicitly ask the system to grant them capabilities for remote system
services they wish to access. If a process has no permission to a specific system service
and still asks for a capability for it, the system will issue it a capability with zero access
rights. This means the process can only invoke the public2 methods of the remote system
service. Invoking a protected method in this case will raise a security exception. The
moment an app receives a capability with non-zero access rights, it can use it to execute
the protected methods of corresponding remote system service, or delegate it to another
process with less or the same access rights of the capability.
System Server
Although system services are distributed among several processes (see Subsection 2.1.1
System Services), the system server hosts most of these services and, therefore, we
consider it for all communication flows. In our design, each system service must implement
a reference monitor that merely relies on the access rights of the capabilities associated
with the incoming requests. This is similar to the conventional approach for permission
2Public methods are normally security and privacy insensitive.
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enforcement (discussed in Section 2.2.2 Android’s Permission System), where system
services implement a per-method reference monitor. However, in the conventional
permission system, system services use the UID and PID of the incoming request and
consult another system service, namely, the PMS, to decide whether to allow the request
or not. On the other hand, capabilities enable in-place access control without relying
on any knowledge stored anywhere other than the access rights associated with the
capability of the incoming request. The check itself is cheap and performed using bitwise
operations on the access rights. Throughout the following discussion, we assume that all
system services are already registered into the CM.
Context Manager
In stock Android, the Binder driver requests3 a handle value from the CM for a specific
service name and for a specific process. In turn, the CM returns the handle value of
that service. We extend this flow by making the CM return the handle value and the
access rights which the process’s sandbox has on the target system service referenced
by the handle. We extend the functionalities of the CM to supply it with the high-level
permissions necessary to compute the access rights of the capabilities issued to processes.
Our design makes sure that changes on the high-level permissions is reflected directly in
the CM. This guarantees that the computed access rights are up-to-date and no privilege-
escalation or downgrading would unintentionally happen. For the sake of brevity in this
section, we assume that all permission information granted to all sandboxes is already
reported to the CM which is now able to compute the correct access rights for issued
capabilities.
Binder Driver
Each IPC transaction in the Binder framework goes through the Binder driver, see
Section 2.3 Binder Framework. This makes the Binder driver the perfect component to
introduce our changes for capability management (more on this later in this section),
such as delegation, revocation, and assigning access rights to capabilities. However,
the changes need to be lightweight to not affect the overall performance of the Binder
framework. The Binder driver is keeps track of all capabilities and the associated access
rights issued to each process. This enables the delegation and revocation of capabilities.
We should mention that we have two modes of operation: capability and normal
modes. The mode of operation is applied globally based on a boolean value, namely,
isCapMode. For example, in the capability mode, all processes that acquire service
handles to the LMS would be subject to access control using capabilities as opposed to
permissions access control in normal mode.
3This request is made on behalf of the calling process.
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(a) Acquiring a capability for
a system service
(b) Invoking the system service using
the acquired capability
(c) Capability Delegation
Figure 4.1: Abstract Flows For Acquiring, Invoking, and Delegating Capabilities
Next, we present the abstract communication flows for acquiring, delegating, revoking,
and invoking capabilities. In this section, we refrain from discussing some corner cases
that require special handling by our design. Instead, we discuss those special cases in
the in the next section.
Acquiring Capability
The Figure 4.1a, depicts the abstract communication flow used to acquire a capability
for a system service. The flow starts by a process invoking the getSystemService() API
from the application framework (step 1©), which initiates an IPC to the CM process.
In stock Android, this API returns a Binder handle to the system service (see Section
2.3.1 Context Manager). In our design, this API still returns a Binder handle but with
more fine-grained access rights associated with it, forming a fully fledged capability. The
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Binder driver, as an intermediary for all IPC calls, intercepts the call, injects callers
identity (PID and UID), and forwards the request to the CM process (steps 2© and 3©).
The CM uses its up-to-date database of permissions to compute the access rights of
the process on the desired system service which is referenced by its name (step 5©) and
returns the handle of the service along with the computed access rights to the kernel
(step 6©). Finally, the kernel creates a new Binder handle (internally, it is a Binder
reference), injects the access rights returned from the CM inside it (step 7©), and returns
the Binder handle to the calling process (step 7©). Eventually, the app process will have
a Binder handle (step 8©) that references a remote system service and encodes access
rights in it.
Capability Invocation
As shown in Figure 4.1b, app’s process can now use the handle it received from the CM
to access the target system service. For simplicity, we assume the handle (or capability)
is for the LMS. The flow of invoking a method from the LMS starts with the process
initiating an IPC to the system server process (step 1©). However, the request passes
through the Binder driver which injects callers access rights, and identity (PID and
UID), into the request before forwarding it to the system server (steps 2© and 3©).
The system server dispatches the request to the LMS. The LMS then uses the newly
introduced API getCallingCapability() to retrieve the bit mask that encodes caller’s access
rights. Then, it performs an in-place check (step 4©) to decide whether the calling process
has the required permission to execute the target method or not. Finally, the request
is either served and the result gets back to the caller, if any, or a security exception is
raised indicating that the caller does not have the required permission.
Capability Delegation
Any process that possesses a capability with non-zero access rights can delegate it to
other processes over the Binder framework. The Figure 4.1c shows how the process (A)
delegates the capability (H) to the process (B). The outcome of this operation must
be that process (B) has a capability (H”) which references the same object referenced
by the original capability with the same or less access rights of the original capability.
Capabilities can only be transferred (delegated) over the Binder framework. Therefore,
both processes, (A) and (B), have to establish a client-server Binder IPC channel. The
process (B) is the server while process (A) is the client. Additionally, process (B) have
to expose an API for process (A) so the capability can be sent through it. If everything
is set, the flow of delegation goes as following: Process (A) invokes the interface exposed
by process (B) and attaches the capability and the desired access rights (step 1©). The
Binder driver intercepts the transaction and check for validity of the delegation request.
If the delegation is permissible, a new capability (H”) is created for process (B) with the
passed access rights (step 2©). Then, the driver sends the new capability to process (B)
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(step 3©). Finally, process (B) receives the capability (H”) and can use it to access the
associated system service as described earlier with respect to the access rights associated
with it.
Capability Revocation
When it comes to the revocation of capabilities, we have to consider two scenarios caused
by two different events:
1. Revoking capabilities by the system: This scenario happens when the user revokes
a permission group from an app using the the ”Settings” system app. For this
scenario, the revoked permissions are reported to the CM and the app is restarted,
only if it was already running (this actually happens in stock Android). Since
capabilities are bound to processes, killing a process will delete all the capabilities
associated with it. Therefore, the restarted process has to request new capabilities
for system services. At this point, it is guaranteed that any new issued capabilities
will reflect the most up-to-date privileges granted to the requester process.
2. Revoking capabilities by apps: This scenario happens when a process (A) delegates
a capability to another process (B) and then wants to revoke it. In this case,
revocation is not implemented through deletion but as reducing of access rights.
For example, process (A) can use ”0” as the new access rights, dictating that
process (B) no longer can access the protected methods of the target system service.
It worth noting that this method can also be used to upgrade the access rights of
the capabilities delegated by processes.
4.3 Management of Capabilities
In this section, we cover in details how capabilities are obtained and how access rights
are computed and attached to it. Further, we discuss how to delegate, revoke, and invoke
capabilities.
4.3.1 Capabilitys Access Rights
While presenting the ”big picture” of our design, we assumed that the CM has the most
up-to-date knowledge that is necessary to encode the high-level permissions into access
rights for the capabilities issued to every process. In this subsection, we elaborate on
how this is done and why the CM has been chosen for this task in the first place.
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The process of creating capabilities requires some logic for encoding the high-level
permissions into a limited-size variable which is attached to each capability. The entity
responsible of the task of encoding access rights, needs to possess information about all
the high-level permissions granted to each app. This seems very fitting task for the PMS
which maintains a hash-map of all apps and their permissions. However, capabilities are
issued per-process while the PMS stores permissions per-UID, and its logic for mapping
PID to apps is not straightforward (has to go through the AMS). Furthermore, the PMS
is not involved in the process of acquiring a capability, and consequently, the driver must
initiates an IPC to the PMS which, in fact, this drastic changes because the driver is a
passive component that only forwards requests and do not initiate IPC requests itself.
Based on that, the PMS is no longer a candidate for the task of encoding access rights.
The next component to consider is the Binder driver which only deals with processes
and does not have any information about high-level permissions associated with apps.
Therefore, if Binder driver should handle the task of encoding access rights, we have
to supply it with the high-level information and it should store that information in the
kernel space. However, since the Binder driver is involved in all Binder IPC transactions,
it should not contain any complex logic that could possibly cause unnecessary overhead
on all Binder IPC transactions. Moreover, it is a bad practice to encode high-level
semantic in kernel drivers. Therefore, the Binder driver cannot be considered for this
task.
This leaves us with the CM, which has been chosen for this task for several reasons:
1. It has a notion of processes and apps at the same time. For example, the CM in
stock Android prevents isolated processes that run with special UIDs.
2. Even though it does not have any information about the high-level permissions, it
can be extended easily so this information is supplied to it.
3. It acts as a single entry point for processes that require handles to system services
registered with it. The point of time when a Binder handle is returned should
logically be the time when the access right is computed.
The aforementioned reasons, makes the CM the perfect component to compute the
access rights of each process. Therefore, the next task would be to supply it with the
knowledge of the high-level permissions assigned to each app.
We have extended the CM to support a new command (in addition to the commands
used for registering and getting services). Similar to how services are registered and
retrieved, the PMS invokes the new command of the CM whenever a new permission is
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Figure 4.2: Reporting Permissions
granted or revoked. The parameters for this call are the UID of the app, the permission
name, and a boolean value that indicates whether the action is granting or revoking.
The CM maintains a linked list that holds only granted permissions reported from
the CM, without duplication. If a permission is granted then revoked, its corresponding
entry in the list maintained by the CM is removed. Given that the PMS get notified
when an app is deleted, it revokes all permissions associated with the app. Therefore, it
is guaranteed that the CM will keep permission information for installed apps only.
The Figure 4.2, shows a high-level view on how permissions are reported from app
and settings app to the CM.
Access Rights Encoding
When all permissions for each app is reported to the CM, then it becomes feasible for the
CM to compute the access rights for each process on the target capability. Our design
imposes a limitation on the size of the variable where the access rights will be encoded
in, specifically, it is 32 bits. This means, only 32 permissions can be encoded per service
where each bit represents a granted/not granted state of a high-level permission.
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For the CM to be able to encode the access rights, it has to know what permissions
are used in each service. Therefore, we ran through the LMS (and associated classes)
and found that it uses 6 permissions to control access to its methods. We have done the
same for another WifiService and found that is uses only three permissions (see Table
4.1). We made those groups available to the CM by statically writing them in its code.
The order for which those permissions decides the encoded access rights. For example,
assume an app is granted permission (1), (3), and (6). Then, the equivalent bitwise
access right is 0xA200. The logic of encoding of the access rights in the CM must be
in sync with the decoding logic on the service side. Otherwise, undesired side effects of
privilege escalation and prevention will occur.
We should mention that permissions are stored with the service name as registered
in the CM. This enables the CM to identify only the permission for a specific service.
Table 4.1: Permissions Required Per Service
Service Index Permission
LMS (location)
0 ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
1 ACCESS FINE LOCATION
2 ACCESS LOCATION EXTRA COMMANDS
3 CONTROL LOCATION UPDATES
4 INSTALL LOCATION PROVIDER
5 LOCATION HARDWARE
WifiService (wifi)
0 ACCESS WIFI STATE
1 CHANGE WIFI MULTICAST STATE
2 CHANGE WIFI STATE
4.3.2 Acquiring Capabilities
When the system is in the capability mode, processes use the getSystemService() API
which invokes the getService() API from the ServiceManagerProxy to acquire a capability
for the desired remote system service referenced by a name supplied to the API. The
same API is used, when the system is in the normal mode, to acquire a Binder handle
to a system service. In both cases, the returned result is the same, which is merely a
handle to a system service. However, when the system is in the capability mode, a special
kernel-level arrangements are done on the Binder handle to turn it into a capability.
Those arrangements include extending the structure of the Binder handle to hold the
access rights of the owning process, and introducing more computational logic on the
extended Binder handle (i.e., for delegation, revocation, and invocation).
Figure 4.3 depicts the detailed flow for acquiring the capability for the LMS. The
flow builds on the knowledge we have accumulated so far. Specifically:
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1. The system server process instantiates all of its services and registers those instances
(called Binder objects) into the CM to make them accessible over the Binder
framework. We assume all services, including the LMS, have already been registered.
2. The client process in this flow, namely the app, can access the CM directly. However,
it cannot yet access the LMS because it does not possess a Binder handle to it.
3. A Binder handle is simply a Binder reference that points to the target Binder node.
The Binder reference is stored in a special data structure on clients Binder process.
4. The CM collects the information needed to compute the access rights of the
capabilities issued to each calling process. This information is always up-to-date to
ensure the correctness of the computed access rights.
Compared to the process of acquiring a Binder handle to a remote system service
(as discussed in Subsection 2.3 Binder Framework), only two changes are introduced by
our design. Those changes are as follow:
1. When the getSystemService() request reaches the CM, it uses the UID of the caller
to retrieve all permissions associated with the desired service name. Then, for
each permission, it sets or clears the corresponding bit in the a 32-bit variable that
would eventually encode all access rights. Finally, the CM returns the encoded
access rights and the handle value of the desired service to the Binder driver.
2. The Binder driver searches the tree of Binder references, stored in the Binder
process of the CM, and locates the Binder reference that has a handle equivalent
to the handle value returned from the CM. The Binder driver then duplicates this
Binder reference, injects the access rights returned from the CM into it, changes
the handle value of the new Binder reference, and then inserts it inside the tree
of Binder references that belong to apps Binder process. Finally, it returns the
handle value to apps process.
App’s process can now use the handle to invoke methods of the LMS. Next, we
discuss how the Binder driver facilitates that.
4.3.3 Capability Invocation
In comparison to the flow discussed in Subsection 2.3 Binder Framework, accessing a
remote system service in the capability mode has two significant differences. Those
differences go as follow:
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Figure 4.3: Requesting Capabilities
1. The driver intercepts the invocation call from the app’s process, locates the Binder
reference associated with the Binder handle of the request, retrieves the access
rights and the reference of the target service from the Binder reference (step 1©),
locates an available IPC thread for the target service, injects caller’s identity into
the transaction data (including the access rights), and finally copies transaction
data into the TLS of the server’s IPC thread (step 2©). The transaction data then
becomes available to the IPC thread handling the request on the server side.
2. When the request reaches the system server, it dispatches the transaction to the
LMS. While handling the request, the LMS can call the Binder.getCallingCapability()
API to retrieve the access rights of the calling process from the TLS of the IPC
thread that carried the transaction (step 3©). The LMS performs bit-wise opera-
tions on the access rights of the calling process to see if the caller can execute the
target method.
As opposed to the conventional reference monitoring on the server side which requires
consulting the PMS4, only one cheap arithmetic operation is needed in the proposed
4the system server hosts both the LMS and PMS which means no IPC is required for this case.
However, other services, such as CameraService, could live on another process causing an IPC request to
issued for each permission check.
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design to decide on allowing or rejecting the request (see Listing 4.1).
1 int ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION_MASK = 0x0001;
2 int ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION_MASK = 0x0002;
3 int ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS_MASK = 0x0004;
4 int CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES_MASK = 0x0008;
5 int INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER_MASK = 0x0010;
6 int LOCATION_HARDWARE_MASK = 0x0020;
7
8 private int getAllowedResolutionLevel(int pid , int uid) {
9 int capability = Binder.getCallingCapability ();
10 if (( capability & ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION_MASK) != 0) {
11 return RESOLUTION_LEVEL_FINE;
12 } else if (( capability & ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION_MASK) != 0) {
13 return RESOLUTION_LEVEL_COARSE;




Listing 4.1: Reference Monitor On Capabilities
4.3.4 Capability Delegation
In stock Android, a process can transfer a Binder handle to another process over the
Binder framework. It would be very beneficial if we can re-use the same flow of transferring
Binder handles for capability delegation for the following reasons: First, we would benefit
from the security model of the Binder framework that prevents malicious processes from
interfering in the IPC, e.g., by changing the target of the delegation and access rights.
Second, the performance of the delegation process would be nearly as efficient as any
Binder IPC transaction.
The application framework enables the transmission of Binder handles by providing
the writeStrongBinder()5 API from Parcel class which takes an object of type IBinder.
This API attaches the IBinder object to the parcel that carries other transaction data
which need to be sent to the target process. Figure 4.4 depicts the flow which takes place
when a process sends a Binder handle to another process. The flow goes as follow:
1. Both sender and receiver of the Binder handle must establish a Binder IPC channel.
The sender (client) holds a proxy for the remote Binder object that encapsulates
the service offered by the receiver (server).
5In addition to transferring Binder handles, app developers can use this API to transfer Binder objects
between processes. In both cases, the API does not write the object itself. However, it writes the value of
the Binder handle or the token that references the Binder object in the user space of the owner process.
The receiver process will get a Binder handle regardless of what the sender has originally sent.
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Figure 4.4: Transferring Binder Handles Between Apps
2. The client attaches the Binder handle to the parcel that needs to be sent to the
receiver process using writeStrongBinder(), and then invokes an operation from the
remote Binder object using its local proxy (step 1©). This operation expects to
receive a Binder handle.
3. The request reaches the Binder driver which recognizes that transaction data
contains a Binder handle which the receiver process should have. Thus, the driver
searches the tree of Binder references of the sender Binder process. Then, it locates
the Binder reference (R) that has a handle value that is equal to the value of the
transmitted Binder handle. Then, the driver duplicates (R) into (R”), changes the
handle of the duplicated entry, and inserts (R”) into the tree of Binder references
of the receiver Binder process (step 2©).
4. The Binder driver then forwards the request to the receiver process which in turn
extracts the Binder handle from the parcel (step 3©).
Enabling app developers to use this mechanism for delegating capabilities imposes
three challenges:
First, the application framework builds a manager around the Binder handle that
references the system service. The framework hides the methods used to extract Binder
50 Chapter 4 Design and Implementation
handles from the managers. However, we need such functionalities from application
framework to enable delegation. Thus, we used Java reflection to extract the Binder
handle from a manager at sender’s side. On receiver’s side, we use the reverse operation
using reflection to build the manager. We preferred not to expose the hidden methods
from application framework as that would be a bad practice and might open the door
for security issues. In Listing 4.2, we present the code used in extract Binder handles
from the WifiManager and build the managers again.
Second, we need to create an API that is similar to writeStrongBinder() but accepts
an extra parameter that represents the access rights to be delegated. The new API is
called writeDelegatedStrongBinder(). Note that cannot simply attach the access rights as
a parameter in the parcel because then it would be serialized in a data buffer because
the Binder driver then, has to look inside the buffer to extract the access rights, which
would be inefficient. Instead, we attach the access rights to the transaction data as a
separate attribute.
Third, we need to introduce the delegation logic in the Binder driver, in which the
driver does not only create a Binder reference in the receivers Binder process, but also
attaches the new access rights after checking them for validity into it. The validity check
makes sure that the set of delegated access rights is a subset of the original access rights
acquired by the sender.
1 public IBinder extractBinderHandle(WifiManager wifiManager) {
2 IBinder binder = null;
3 try {
4 Class wifiManagerClass = wifiManager.getClass ();
5 Field mServicefield = wifiManagerClass.getDeclaredField("mService");
6 mServicefield.setAccessible(true);
7 Object proxy = mServicefield.get(wifiManager );
8 Field mRemotefield = proxy.getClass (). getDeclaredField("mRemote");
9 mRemotefield.setAccessible(true);
10 binder = (IBinder) mRemotefield.get(proxy);






17 public WifiManager constructWifiManager(IBinder binder) {
18 WifiManager wm = null;
19 try {
20 Class iwmStub = Class.forName("android.net.wifi.IWifiManager$Stub");
21 Method [] aMethods = iwmStub.getDeclaredMethods ();
22 for (Method method : aMethods) {
23 if ("asInterface".equals(method.getName ())) {
24 method.setAccessible(true);
25 Object iwm = method.invoke(null , binder );
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26 Class wmClass = Class.forName("android.net.wifi.WifiManager");
27 for (Constructor constructor : wmClass.getDeclaredConstructors ()) {
28 wm = (wm) constructor.newInstance(
29 RemoteService.this.getBaseContext (),










Listing 4.2: Reflection To Extract Binder Handle From Manager And Constructing
The Manager Again
As a prerequisite for the delegation, the process that is willing to delegate must have
a notion of the access rights associated with the Binder capability it possesses. This can
be done by calling a getAccessRights() API which returns a bit-mask that encodes the
access rights.
This implementation can be extended to keep track of each delegated capability (by
extending the Binder reference with the parent/children). This is especially helpful for an
advanced logic of revocation, i.e., revoking a capability results in revoking all capabilities
that have been instantiated from it. Additionally, Binder capabilities can be extended to
carry a flag that prevents delegation.
The same channel used for delegation can be used again to downgrade or upgrade the
access rights of the delegated capability. As we will discuss next, we use the downgrading
of access rights as a special form of revocation.
As a final note, we can observe that the CM is not involved in the delegation flow
and it is up to the delegator process to decide what access rights can be transferred to
the receiver process. In turn, it is the responsibility of the Binder driver to correctly
compute the access rights of the receiver of the delegation based on the access rights of
the sender.
4.3.5 Revocation of Capabilities
There are two techniques for revocation triggered by two different events in the system.
The first technique is through actual capability deletion. The second technique is
through downgrading the access rights of the delegated capability to zero. Implementing
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revocation through downgrading of access rights implies that a process would still have a
reference to the remote system service. However, it cannot access its protected methods.
Revoking Capabilities via Settings App
As discussed in Subsection 2.2.2 Android’s Permission System, starting from Android 6,
Android allows users to revoke permissions by groups. When the user decides to revoke
a permission group, the app is killed, gracefully. Before the app is killed, the system
takes memory snapshots of the running processes of the app and then kills all of them.
The system then instructs the PMS to revoke all permissions of the group. The PMS
would then report this change in permissions to the CM which would remove all revoked
permissions from its list). If the app is opened again, the system forks a new process
from zygote, loads apps code, and restores the corresponding memory snapshot into the
memory.
Revoking/Downgrading Delegated Capabilities
Processes that delegate a capability to another process can change the access rights
associated with the delegated capability based on an internal logic using the same channel
used for delegation. If the access rights are set to zero, then we call that a revocation of
the capability.
To change the access rights of a delegated capability, the process has to use the
already established delegation channel. This means, the delegator process have to use the
writeDelegatedStrongBinder() for the same Binder handle but with new access rights. This
method works because each process can only have one capability for each system service
at any point of time. The new access rights which is passed in the API will overwrite
the access rights which the target process originally has, if any, on the corresponding
system service. The Binder driver has to make sure that the new degraded access rights
are a subset of the access rights that the delegator process originally has.
4.4 Implementation
In this section, we present the scope of our design and the limitations imposed by our
implementation. Then, we provide a brief analysis of the amount and type of changes we
introduced.
4.4.1 Scope and Limitations
The capabilities introduced by our design are specific to the system services that fulfill
the following condition: they are registered in the CM and accessible over the Binder
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framework using the getSystemService() API. Consequently, the design does not support
capabilities for services that are not registered in the CM, such as user-defined services.
Moreover, the getSystemService() API does not retrieve all services registered with the
CM. For example, developers have to use the ContentResolver to access the content
system service, and to record audio, developers use the RecordAudio class (which uses
the surfaceflinger service).
Among all system services that fulfill the condition mentioned above, we decided
to adapt the LMS and WifiService to use capabilities for access control. We have built
two apps that serve as a prototype. The first app request all dangerous and normal
permissions to both services and delegate access to both to the second app. The second
app makes calls to those services which control the access using permissions. Due to
time limitations, we could not adapt more services. However, we performed an analysis
on all system services protected by permissions, and the results show that we can apply
capabilities on 18 other system service which are protected by 60% of the permissions
defined in the system. More on this in Subsection 6.2 Coverage and Effectiveness
Since we rely on Android’s permission system for creating access rights on capabilities,
we report all granted and revoked permission from PackageManagerService to the CM. We
do not exclude any permission from being reported even though some normal permissions,
like android.permission.INTERNET, are enforced by DAC Subsection 2.2.2 Android’s
Permission System.
On another point, we do not implement a global switch that controls what mode the
system is in, i.e., capability mode or normal mode. This switch is currently distributed
between kernel and user space components. Furthermore, we do not implement switching
between modes at runtime. Instead, the system (kernel and AOSP) must be configured
to use a specific mode before building it.
Regarding acquiring capabilities, the developer should request a capability, using
getSystemService() API, after she is granted the permission(s) to the target service. This
is because access rights of the capability is attached to Binder reference in the kernel
only upon calling this API.
As for revoking delegated capabilities, we do not implement a way for actually
deleting the delegated capability. Instead, we enable the app developer to reduce the
access rights of the delegated capability to 0 based on apps logic.
We do not enforce a policy for delegation across apps. This magnifies some attack
scenarios as we would discuss in the following chapter. Another less serious issue related
to the fact that when a capability is delegated, the sender has to take care of extracting
the Binder handle from the manager using reflection before sending the handle to the
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receiver who, in turn, must reconstruct the manager out of the delegated capability,
also using reflection. This requires a detailed knowledge of the class structure of the
manage. We did not have time to implement a simpler way to extract Binder handles
and reconstruct manager without using reflection.
During early stages of this work, we tried to build the Goldfish kernel of version
4.4 and use it with AOSP of Android 7. Although both builds succeed, we could not
manage to run the default Android emulator of AOSP. We tried several configurations
and versions with the same failing outcome. Eventually, we managed to run goldfish v.3.4
against AOSP of Android 6.1 and Android 7.1.2. We observed that no drastic changes
are done on the Binder kernel module. Therefore, we believe our approach would work
on any version of Goldfish. However, we have not tested that.
4.4.2 Changes on AOSP and Kernel
Before we started the implementation phase, we minutely explored Android’s platform
and kernel. This helped us afterward to reduce the amount of code used to come
up with a working prototype. Since we touched several layers of Android’s software
stack, we had to write code in three programming languages. In total, we have writ-
ten 756 lines on codes (LoCs). Table 4.2 shows the number of LoC per language and
project. We calculated the number of LoCs manually after extracting the patch files
from AOSP (using repo) and kernel (using git). As we excluded comments and lines
of code used for logging, we believe our prototype will not work without any of these lines.






Goldfish Kernel C 30
In general, changes in Java introduce new APIs to app developers used for acquiring
a capability, attaching a capability in a parcel delegation, query about access rights of a
capability (see Table 4.3). Other internal APIs are used for reporting permissions to the
CM, extracting access rights from IPC threads, etc. C++ changes, in most cases, are
meant to transfer requests made from Java to the kernel and back. One of the important
changes are those made to the IPCThreadState.cpp which provide the necessary API for
the system services to call, over JNI, to retrieve the access rights of the calling process
from the IPC thread.
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C changes in AOSP are used to extend the servicemanager daemon process to
accept the permissions reported from application framework. They also adapt the
get servicefunctionality to compute capabilities of the caller process and return it to the
Binder driver.
Changes in the kernel are straightforward. They attach capabilities to the invocation
requests. They also assign capabilities to new handles upon capability acquiring and
delegation. A simple logic based on the access rights of the source and target takes place
to decide if the delegation request is valid.
Part of the reasons behind the mass adoption of Android is its high usability from
end user’s perspective. Our design maintains this usability intact. In fact, end users
cannot tell whether they are using the system in the capability or the normal mode.




Binder handle In the capability mode, this function
causes the CM to compute access rights
of the caller over the service, referenced
by the name. The Binder driver then
injects the access rights in the Binder
reference and return the handle that
references the Binder reference to the
caller process. The application frame-
work builds a proxy around that han-
dle. The proxy then gets wrapped by a
manger. In both operating modes, this
API returns a manager.
getAccessRights() Integer Used on the service manager object
to retrieve the access rights associated
with the capability. This helps the de-
veloper to decide what access rights can
be delegated.
writeDelegatedStrongBinder
(IBinder binder, int delegated-
Capability)
void Used to delegate a capability to a pro-
cess that listens on the other side. This
API is called on the parcel sent to the
target process. The same API is used to
revoke access to a capability by setting




In this section, we analyze the new security features introduced by our design. We first
start by laying out our assumptions concerning Android’s permission system and Binder
framework. Then we present the attacker model illustrating attackers capabilities and
goals. Later, we discuss known attack scenarios against stock Android and shed light
on how we can employ the new security features to prevent those attacks. We also
present other attack scenarios introduced, or became more easier to establish, by our
implementation.
5.1 Assumptions
To reasonably argue about the benefits and the shortcomings of our design from a security
point of view, we need to establish a few assumptions that remain true throughout this
discussion.
First, we assume that the Binder framework guarantees the unforgeability and
uniqueness of Binder handles. Thereby, Binder capabilities are also guaranteed to be
unforgeable and unique for each process. We further assume that data transferred over
Binder IPC is confidential and tamper-proof. Thus, we roll out root-based attacks
against the Binder framework [27] or even the kernel [52][55] from our consideration.
Such attacks have devastating impacts on the whole system and would trivially break
our assumptions. We also exclude attacks that aim to jeopardize system functionality by
misusing the Binder framework, i.e., the DoS attack described by Huan Feng et al. [35].
Additionally, we assume system services and their host processes are immune to attacks
and implement bug-free access control (this assumption rolls out the attack against
system server process [3]).
57
58 Chapter 5 Security Analysis
We further assume that Androids permission system cannot be bypassed. This means
all installed apps, either through app managers or ADB, would have to declare required
permissions in their manifest files. Permissions will be granted to the apps only upon
the consent of the end user, either at runtime or install time. Therefore, Attacks that
trick end user to grant permissions to malicious apps using overlay UIs [54] and phishing
techniques are also excluded from our analysis.
In general, we focus on attacks that circumvent the permission system or take
advantage of the Binder framework, i.e., for communication and remote code execution,
to cause privilege escalation and violate the principle of least privilege.
5.2 Attacker Model
The attacker in our case is capable of writing malicious code and hiding it inside apps
and 3rd-party libraries. Such malicious code will eventually run on the mobile devices of
the end users, i.e., by installing the malicious apps or including the malicious libraries in
other installed benign apps. We assume the attacker has multiple malicious apps owned
by her that could run on user’s device. For simplicity, we disregard the case of running
multiple benign apps that include different malicious libraries owned by attacker as it
would have the same effect of running two malicious apps owned by the attacker.
The ultimate goal of the attacker is to leak protected sensitive information of end
users without risking of being discovered and getting labeled as malicious. Otherwise,
end users will not install her malicious apps, and other app developers will not include
her malicious libraries in their benign apps.
We also assume the attacker to be smart and not to request permissions that deemed
unreasonable to end users based on the announced functionalities of the apps or libraries.
We further assume the attacker is aware of the continuous endeavors of app developers
and end users to limit her privileges on devices resources. Therefore, we assume the
attacker would try to circumvent those measures to achieve her goals. This is essential
when we discuss our approach for sandboxing malicious 3rd-party library using capabilities.
Finally, we assume the attacker to be knowledgeable of other apps running on the
system and expert enough to discover and exploit exposed services of those apps. This
assumption is a necessary to launch confused deputy attacks.
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5.3 Attack Scenarios
In the following, we present two categories of attacks. The first category consists of
attacks that can be prevented or mitigated by our design. The second category includes
attacks that have been introduced or became, even more, easier to establish in our design.
5.3.1 Mitigated Attacks
In this subsection, we present two attack scenarios which can be mitigated by our design.
5.3.1.1 Confused deputy
In this attack scenario, a benign app (called a deputy) is tricked into executing a sensitive
operation on attackers behalf who does not have the required permissions to execute
the operation herself. Androids security model cannot prevent this type of privilege
escalation because it cannot reveal the identities of the apps involved in the transitive
invocations.
Several solutions have been proposed to mitigate this attack [43][34]. Michael Dietz
Wu et al. [31] proposed to keep track of the call chain enabling apps to authenticate
the chain at runtime and dropping the call in case one app does not have the required
permission. Another work by Bugiel et al. [30] which also relies on the call chain, provides
a reference monitor that enforces transitive policies on IPC between apps and system
services.
We mitigate this attack using capabilities. However, our solution assumes that the
app developer has some degree of security awareness and is willing to invest more efforts
in hardening her app. We further assume that the deputy is deliberately exposing an
interface to other processes. This interface makes a call to a protected operation from a
system service. Only processes possessing a specific access right/permission can execute
this operation through the interface.
To illustrate our approach for mitigating the confused deputy problem, we present
Figure 5.1 which depicts three processes, i.e., (A), (B), and (C), and a service (S). Process
(A) is under the control of the app developer. It exposes an interface that implements a
complex functionality which invokes the operation (O) from the service (S). The service
(S) requires processes willing to call operation (O) to possess a capability to it with
access rights of (0x1). Processes (B) and (C) hold capabilities to (S) with access rights
of 0x0 and 0x3 accordingly. The goal is to permit (C) to access operation (O) through
(A)’s interface while preventing the same operation for (B).
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Figure 5.1: Mitigating The Confused Deputy Attack
We can achieve the aforementioned requirement through capability delegation. Both
processes (B) and (C) have to delegate their capabilities, for service (S), to process (A).
In turn, process (A) will use the delegated capabilities to invoke the operation (O). Notice
that (A) does not have to enforce any type of access control as it moves this task to the
service. Consequently, the service will allow process (C) to access the service, as it has
the required access rights, and reject deny the request from (B).
5.3.1.2 Inclusion of Malicious Library
Developers rely on 3rd-party libraries for reducing the programming effort, providing
analytics, and monetizing apps. All included 3rd-party libraries run inside apps sandbox
and share the same privileges granted to the app. Additionally, such libraries tend
to request even more permissions putting users privacy and security at risk of being
compromised [28][42][36]. Based on our attack model, we assume that 3rd-party libraries
can be malicious by themselves and must not run with the full authority of the parent
sandbox. Instead, 3rd-party libraries must be granted the least privileges they require
and deemed to be reasonable to app developers.
Several approaches have been proposed to address this issue and they vary from
completely blocking 3rd-party libraries [53], especially advertisements libraries, to com-
partmentalizing them [44][56]. One novel approach that does not break the same origin
policy of apps nor requires firmware changes is what Jie Huang et al. [38] have proposed
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(a) Library Runs In The Main Process (b) Library Runs In An Isolated Process
Figure 5.2: Mitigating The Problem of 3rd-party Library
of isolating the advertisements library into a separate app at compile time and assign it
the minimum permissions required. As a result, new Binder IPC protocol needs to be
established between the original app and the app which runs the library.
Our design addresses this problem through delegation of capabilities. Before present-
ing the approach, we setup a scenario of the problem and define our goals. As depicted in
Figure 5.2a, we consider a case of an app (A) that runs a 3rd-party library (L). There are
two system services (S1) and (S2) which are protected by (Cap1) and (Cap2), accordingly.
These capabilities are granted to the app (A). We assume that library (L) requires the
(Cap1) to access the service (S1) to perform some functionality. Since the library (L)
runs inside the sandbox of the app (A), it can access both services (S1) and (S2). The
goal is to prevent that from happening and only allowing the library (L) to access the
service (S1).
Our proposed solution requires the app developer to be effectively involved in the
process of hardening the app. According to the attacker model, we assume that the
developer of the library is willing to cooperate with app developers so that she would look
honest while hiding her malicious intentions. As depicted in Figure 5.2b, our solution
constitutes that library (L) must run in an isolated process, while the rest of the app
runs in the main process. Isolated processes are prevented from accessing any resource
because they can not acquire permissions nor possess capabilities directly from the CM.
The main process would acquire two capabilities to (Cap1) and (Cap2) and only delegate
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the capability for (S1) to the isolated process. This is technically possible as no SELinux
policies are enforced to prevent the Binder driver from transmitting Binder handles (and
capabilities) to isolated processes. The access rights of the delegated capability must
be instrumented to only grant the least privilege required by the library to function
properly.
As mentioned earlier, this approach requires cooperation from the developers of
3rd-party libraries as they need to implement special interfaces to receive the delegated
capabilities. They additionally need to adapt their code to use the delegated capabilities
instead of requesting their own (which will not be possible).
5.3.2 Attacks Against Our Design
In this subsection, we present two types of attacks that have been introduced or became
more easier to establish due to our implementation.
5.3.2.1 Collude attacks
Similar to the confused deputy attack, collude attacks benefit from the shortcomings of
Androids permission system and its inability to detect and enforce policies on transitive
invocations. Colluding apps normally belong to the same attacker and use overt and covert
channels for communications between them. The challenge, from attackers perspective,
is how to employ two or more apps that acquire different permissions to collaboratively
leak sensitive information about the end users.
For example, one app, called (A), has permission to users phone book but does not
have permission to use the internet. Another app, called (B), can access the internet.
Both apps are under attackers control. The collude attack can be easily established by
retrieving users phone book in the app (A), sending it to the app (B) which, in turn,
sends it to a remote server breaking end users privacy.
This attack becomes more severe in our design because colluding apps can commu-
nicate capabilities between each other causing privilege escalation for all of them. The
countermeasure is to prevent delegation among apps and limit it to processes of the same
app. Our design does not yet implement this mitigation technique. In Chapter 7: Future
Work, we present an idea on how we can implement this extension to prevent this type
of attacks.
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5.3.2.2 Overwriting Access Rights
This attack is directly introduced by our design due to the simplified implementation of
the delegation process we have decided to adopt. To understand the attack, we consider
a hypothetical scenario of a malicious process (A) that wants to delegate a capability for
a system service (S) to a benign process (B). Assuming both processes reside on different
app sandboxes. The current implementation enables process (A) to downgrade the access
rights of all the capabilities possessed by the process (B).
Process (A) establishes the attack by creating capabilities to all services in the
system, including service (S). Then, delegate those capabilities to process (B) with zero
access rights. Since the Binder driver keeps only one capability for each system service,
the easiest way to realize the delegation of capabilities is through overwriting the access
rights while keeping the references of capabilities intact. As a result, process (B) would
have capabilities to all system services with zero access rights on them.
This attack becomes meaningless if delegation among apps is prohibited, or if
process (B) does not accept delegation (e.g., it does not expose interfaces for delegation).
Moreover, process (B) can overcome this attack by invalidating old capabilities and
requesting new ones by calling getSystemService(). This guarantees that the CM will





In this chapter, we evaluate our design in three aspects: Performance (to see how much
overhead/gain our design introduces), coverage and effectiveness (by evaluating how close
our implementation is to enable capabilities for all system services), and usability (to
check whether our changes would affect developer’s and user’s experience while using the
system or developing apps). We end the chapter by holding a discussion on whether it is
possible to utilize SELinux to achieve the same outcomes of our design.
6.1 Performance Analysis
In this section, we conduct three time-measurement experiments that show the perfor-
mance gain and overhead caused by our design. We start by presenting the setup for
those experiments, then we explain, in details, how they are conducted before presenting
the results.
6.1.1 Configurations and Setup
Table 6.1 shows versions and configurations used to build the AOSP and the Goldfish
kernel. For some experiments, we built each project twice, one build includes our changes
that implement our approach, and the other build is kept without any modifications
(except for the time measurement code and testing apps). We used the default ARM
Android emulator shipped with AOSP for all experiments.
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config goldfish armv7 defconfig
Figure 6.1: Time Measurement Components
6.1.2 Experiments and Results
Our goal in these experiments is to measure the execution time for three operations:
capability acquiring, delegation, and invocation. Given that delegation and revocation of
capabilities use the same technique, both operations have exactly the same execution
time, and it is adequate to only measure one of them.
To accurately measure the aforementioned operations, we need to isolate them from
other operations that might affect the results. For example, we cannot measure the
invocation time from the client side by simply capturing the time before the invocation
is made and after the result is back, and then subtract both measurements from each
other. This is because the results would highly depend on the workload on the system.
For example, it is possible that the Binder driver delays the invocation request because
it handles other IPC requests that have higher priorities or simply arrived earlier. Since
we cannot guarantee that all requests will be handled on-time, without delays, we have
to find another solution.
We can assume that the cost paid while the request is traveling from one endpoint to
the Binder driver, and from the Binder driver to the target endpoint remains constant for
all IPC requests. This travel time (TT ) appears as single-pointed red arrow in Figure 6.1.
The double-pointed arrows denote double of the TT, e.g., acquiring a capability costs
4×TT . This assumption simplifies the measurements as we only have to measure the
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operations that happen at the endpoints and in the Binder driver. Our design introduces
two operations that take place at the endpoints. Those operations are: Encoding the
access rights from the local permissions stored in the using compute capability() in the
CM 1 (for the operation of acquiring capabilities) and performing access control on
system services using capabilities (for capability invocation). The operations that happen
at the Binder driver are: attaching the capability to the request (for invocation and
delegation) and saving the capability in a Binder reference (for capability acquiring and
delegation).
As a result of this simplification, we can measure the time needed for acquiring a
capability as following: 4×TT + time(compute capability) + time(assigning access rights
to a Binder reference). Notice that Figure 6.1 shows the point of time when the Binder
gets involved in the operation (e.g., when the red arrow touches one of the two boxes in
the Binder driver)
Measurements At The Context Manager
In stock Android, the getSystemService() API caches all live Binder handles retrieved
through it. This is meant to reduce the number of IPC requests made to the CM and,
consequently, improve performance. For the sake of this experiment, we disabled the
caching to make sure that all requests reach the CM.
Our goal in this experiment is to measure the execution time of the function com-
pute capability() from service manager.c. We conducted the experiment by running three
apps that request all ten normal and dangerous permissions to the four different system
services (location, wifi, connectivity, and wallpaper). When permissions are granted, each
application requests a capability for each system service. In total, the compute capability()
function was executed about 1000 times. Since permissions are stored in a linked list, we
chose the ten requested permissions carefully to trigger traversal of almost all nodes in
the permissions list. In total, the list contained about 180 permissions for 41 apps.
This experiment shows that the average time of computing access rights is 1.7ms with
a standard deviation of 2.1ms. The time measurements were done using gettimeofday()
function from <sys/time.h>. The experiment shows a pressing need for re-implementing
the compute capability() function and associated data structures to reduce the time and
storage overhead.
1Since permissions change infrequently, we neglect the overhead caused by reporting permissions from
the PMS to the CM because the reporting is done over Binder IPC and carry parameters of primitive
types. Therefore, reporting a permission costs only 2×TT since it is one-way Binder IPC
68 Chapter 6 Discussion and Evaluation
Measurements At System Services
In our design, system services perform in-place access control using cheap bitwise
arithmetic operations on the access rights associated with the capabilities of calling
processes. This comes with a performance gain as services of stock Android rely on the
PMS to check for caller’s authorization for each invocation to the protected methods.
We conducted the experiment by build two images of AOSP. One image uses the
conventional reference monitoring using the PMS, whereas the other includes our changes
and implements an access control based on capabilities instead of using the PMS. Each
image includes an app that requests the ACCESS FINE LOCATION permission. When
the permission is granted by the user, both apps acquire a capability to the LMS and
call the getLastLocation(). We use System.nanoTime() to measure the execution time of
the permission/access rights checking in both images.
After invoking the reference monitor of both implementation a 1000 time, the results
show that our approach outperforms the conventional permission checking by a factor of
approximately 4.5. The average time overhead caused by our approach is about 20µs
and with a standard deviation of approximately 15.5µs. On the other side, the average
execution time of the permission check logic is about 87µs with a standard deviation of
about 153µs.
It worth noting the LMS that hosts the getLastLocation() resides in the same process
of the PMS (which is the system server as discussed earlier). This causes a local call
to the Binder object of the PMS for permission check. We believe that the amount of
time required for checking camera permissions (from mediaserver process) would show a
significant increase in the execution time as the check would be performed over an IPC.
However, we did not make this experiment for time limitations.
Measurements At The Binder Driver
As shown in the Figure 6.1 and following our discussion on Section 4.3 Capability
Management, the Binder is extended to support two tasks: First, it attaches the access
rights of the calling process to the IPC thread that carries the transaction data to the
system service (see the light green rectangle in Figure 6.1). Second, when a process
delegates a capability to another process or when the CM returns a capability to a
process that requested it, the Binder driver assigns the access rights of the capability
to the Binder reference that is newly created for the receiver process (see the light blue
rectangle in Figure 6.1). Notice that the Binder driver handles the capability returned
from the CM to the requester process as a special form of delegation. Therefore, it is
handled with the same function used to validate delegation requests.
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The first task does not produce any performance overhead, in comparison to stock
Android, as it is exactly similar to how the Binder attaches caller’s UID and PID to the
IPC thread of the system server. However, the second task yields on average an overhead
of about 2.69µs with a standard deviation of about 1.47µs. This overhead is caused by
the logic used for deciding if the delegation is valid. We have derived those results by
conducting the following experiment: Process (A) delegates the capability (for LMS) to
the process (B). This operation is repeated a 1000 time with different access rights to
make sure that only 50% of the delegation requests comply with the delegation rules and,
therefore, are successful.
6.2 Coverage and Effectiveness
During the development phase and while we were examining the possibility for applying
capabilities on all system services (so access to system services can be delegated, revoked,
and enforced by the access rights of capabilities) we came across five categories of
permissions that differ based on the time and place of enforcement.
1. Permissions enforced by system services by calling protected methods using service
managers: This type of permissions is the focus of this work. Although the
permission check could happen in the native code (e.g., CameraService.cpp [16]
enforces the permission CAMERA), enforcement of this type of permissions can
easily be replaced by capability checks and access to system services (for almost all
permissions) can be delegated and revoked. See Table 6.2 for a complete list of
permissions for this category.
2. Permissions enforced by content providers2: Content providers manage access to a
repository of data. Developers can access this data through a ContentResolver object
that is retrieved from app’s context. The ContentResolver composes a handle for the
ContentProvider, which is retrieved through the CM. The ContentResolver can be
used to perform CRUD operations on contacts, calendar, and SMS data. Developers
specify a URI to the repository they wish to access and the ContentProvider makes
two authorization checks. The first is made to the PMS to decide if the caller has
read or write permissions (e.g., READ CONTACTS and WRITE CONTACTS).
The second is made to the AMS to decide if the app has access to the data source
(referenced by its URI). Although we can use capabilities to replace the first check,
we cannot get rid of the second check. The AMS keeps a database of all packages
2We only consider content providers offered by the system, e.g., to access the contacts, calendar, and
SMS messages.
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and URIs assigned to them3, this database is modified only when an app is granted
a permission by the user to a specific resource. Consequently, if we delegated access
to content providers to other processes, the first check could pass (as it would rely
on the access rights of the delegated capability). However, the second check will
always fail because the receiver did not explicitly acquire the permission.
3. Permissions enforced by the AMS upon delivering broadcast messages: Most
permissions are enforced when apps make interactions with the system, e.g., a
background service invokes a protected method of a system service, a user clicks a
button that retrieves data from system services, etc.). However, some permissions
are enforced when the system issues broadcast messages. For example, when an
SMS message is received or when the system finishes booting up. Those broadcasts
are issued by the AMS which checks the permissions of each app to decide whether
to deliver the broadcast message to it or not. The current implementation does not
provide a solution on how to make the authorization check based on capabilities.
4. Permissions enforced by system services when apps send broadcasts or start activities
using Intents: In the current implementation, enforcement of this type of permissions
cannot be replaced by capabilities.
5. Permissions mapped to GIDs and enforced by the kernel.
For the complete list of permissions that are not supported by our design, see Table
6.3. Notice that permissions are associated with a category that corresponds to one of
the five categories above.
The percentage of permissions that can be enforced using capabilities is about 60%.
We support eight dangerous permissions out of 20 defined in the system. As a proof of
concept, we believe we have achieved good coverage. However, the current approach is
far away from being complete.
3This facilitates sharing data between apps. For example, an app can allow another app to access a
specific record but not the whole database by exposing a URI to that record.
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Table 6.2: Permissions Can Be Enforced By Capabilities
Name Level Manager
ACCESS FINE LOCATION dangerous LocationManager
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION dangerous LocationManager
SEND SMS dangerous SmsManager
USE SIP dangerous SipManager
READ PHONE STATE dangerous TelecomManager
CALL PHONE dangerous TelecomManager
(*) BODY SENSORS dangerous SensorManager
(*) CAMERA dangerous CameraManager
READ SYNC SETTINGS normal ContentResolver
READ SYNC STATS normal ContentResolver
WRITE SYNC SETTINGS normal ContentResolver
BROADCAST STICKY normal ActivityManager
KILL BACKGROUND PROCESSES normal ActivityManager
REORDER TASKS normal ActivityManager
SET TIME ZONE normal AlarmManager
MODIFY AUDIO SETTINGS normal AudioManager
ACCESS NETWORK STATE normal ConnectivityManager
CHANGE NETWORK STATE normal ConnectivityManager
TRANSMIT IR normal ConsumerIrManager
USE FINGERPRINT normal FingerprintManager
DISABLE KEYGUARD normal KeyguardManager
ACCESS LOCATION EXTRA COMMANDS normal LocationManager
ACCESS NOTIFICATION POLICY normal NotificationManager
WAKE LOCK normal PowerManager
EXPAND STATUS BAR normal StatusBarManager
VIBRATE normal Vibrator
SET WALLPAPER normal WallpaperManager
SET WALLPAPER HINTS normal WallpaperManager
ACCESS WIFI STATE normal WifiManager
CHG WIFI MULTICAST STATE normal WifiManager
CHANGE WIFI STATE normal WifiManager
(**) GET PACKAGE SIZE normal PackageManager
(***) BLUETOOTH normal BluetoothManager
(***) BLUETOOTH ADMIN normal BluetoothManager
* Permission check happens in native code
** We could not successfully extract the handle out of the PackageManager to delegate it.
Therefore, we assume that access to the PMS cannot be delegated.
*** Permission is also mapped to GID and enforced by DAC and MAC.
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Table 6.3: Permissions That Is Not Supported By Our Design
Category Name Level
2 ADD VOICEMAIL dangerous
2 READ CALL LOG dangerous
2 WRITE CALL LOG dangerous
2 READ CONTACTS dangerous
2 WRITE CALENDAR dangerous
2 WRITE CONTACTS dangerous
2 READ CALENDAR dangerous
2 READ SMS dangerous
3 PROCESS OUTGOING CALLS dangerous
3 RECEIVE SMS dangerous
3 RECEIVE WAP PUSH dangerous
3 RECEIVE MMS dangerous
3 RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED normal
4 INSTALL SHORTCUT normal
4 UNINSTALL SHORTCUT normal
4 REQUEST IGNORE BATTERY OPTIMIZATIONS normal
4 SET ALARM normal
4 REQUEST INSTALL PACKAGES normal
5 READ EXTERNAL STORAGE dangerous
5 WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE dangerous
5 INTERNET normal
unknown RECORD AUDIO dangerous
unknown NFC normal
6.3 SELinux vs. Capabilities
Capabilities introduce new security concepts that exist in neither DAC nor MAC. Specif-
ically, capabilities define fine-grained access rights on resources. A process that holds a
capability can delegate access to other processes and then revoke it. Ideally, the system
can also upgrade and downgrade access rights of issued capabilities without interrupting
processes or causing them to restart.
Given that SELinux, as a MAC, was introduced to cover the shortcomings of DAC
by defining fine-grained access rights through policies, one interesting question is raised:
Is it possible for SELinux to provide the same security features which are enabled by
capabilities? We answer this question using the existing functionalities offered by SELinux
framework as implemented in Android.
First, we start with a simple case where Android, hypothetically, has only one object
which provides N functionalities that need to be protected. Using capabilities, each
process acquires a unique capability token that has N bits which encode access rights on
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the N functionalities of the object. The object, in turn, implements access control by
performing bit-masking on the access rights of the capabilities associated with callers.
One way to establish the same security enforcement using SELinux is to create 2N
types4 which encode every variation of the N permissions. Each process will be assigned
a security context with the type that corresponds to the permissions it acquires. Creating
this amount of types is inevitable because we do not know what permissions each process
will exactly acquire during its lifespan. For example, a process might start with zero
permissions, then acquire more permissions at runtime (as app processes in Android
which are granted permissions by the end user at runtime). Therefore, all possible
variations of the N permissions must be created beforehand. The object, on the other
hand, must be assigned a type that never changes5.
For each of the 2N types, a rule must be defined to govern the functions which can
be accessed for each type. The Listing 6.1 shows an example of the rules that need to
be created for an object that offers only two functionalities (func1, and func2). One
important observation from that listing is that no rule has to be defined to prevent
an unprivileged process from accessing the object because the absence of such rule is
interpreted as a prevention by default. The first rule means that processes of the type
”perm1 1” can execute both functions of the object that has the type ”object type” and
of class ”object class”
1 allow perm1_1 object_type:object_class *;
2 allow perm0_1 object_type:object_class func2;
3 allow perm1_0 object_type:object_class func1;
Listing 6.1: SELinux Allow Rules
So far, one important question is unanswered; Who assigns types to processes in
Android, and when? By default, forked process inherits the security context of the parent
process. To enable switching between security contexts, SELinux enables privileged
processes to change types of self and others, using API exposed from SELinux framework.
For example, Zygote executes selinux android setcontext() on newly forked processes to
change their security contexts, and init.c calls setcon() to change its type.[33]. Another
way for changing security contexts is through transition rules (type transition).
4SELinux is for whitelisting accesses. Therefore, the absence of a rule implies prevention. Consequently,
the number of types and rules is, in fact, 2N - 1 because processes that have no access rights can be
assigned a type that is not associated with any rule.
5As discussed in Subsection 2.2.1 Application Sandboxing, rules rely on the types of subjects and
objects. Changing object’s type would prevent access to it unless other rules with the new type are
defined
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Transition rules are checked when a process executes a special file. The execution, if
allowed, causes the security context of the caller process to change. The new security
context is defined based on the original type and the type of the file executed by the
process. The file represents an entry point to a type transition (this is defined in a rule),
and it is protected by a permission. The process can only cause a change of security
context if it is allowed by another rule to execute the file (granted the permission).
Therefore, for each type transition policy, three rules need to be defined, and one
executable file should be created and assigned a type [26]. Next, we need to employ one
of these techniques to grant permissions, at runtime, to processes.
Since policies should be created, compiled, and attached to Android images before
distribution, the system administrator must create 2N×(2N -1) executable files (and the
same number of types assigned to those file) and triple that number of rules to define
transition policies that enable a process to move from any of the 2N security contexts
to any other context realizing privilege escalation or degrading6. To prevent processes
from illegitimately escalate their privileges, the system7 exposes the executable file to be
executed by the process only when a change of permission associated with the process
occurs. The problem resides on how to force a process to execute a file that degrades
its privileges assuming the process is curious or malicious and would not do that by
itself. Apparently, this approach can easily scale up to become impractical to implement.
Therefore, it is not considered as a solution.
This leaves us with the APIs exposed by SELinux framework. In fact, this approach
deems to be more reasonable. However, the process that causes a change of security
context of another process must be 1) trusted to prevent unintended privilege escalation,
and 2) able to accurately compute the right security contexts for the processes that
reflect permissions acquired by them at runtime. In Android middleware, Zygote can be
modified to fulfill the second requirement and, therefore, protect system services similar to
what we have done in this work. For example Zygote gets notified whenever a permission
is granted/revoked to/from an app and then, it changes the type of running processes of
that app; or when a new process is started, it queries the permissions associated with its
app and assigns the new process to the type accordingly. Since permission change at
runtime is specific to app processes, this solution could work out.
6Another solution could be to create an intermediary type that all processes willing to change types
have to go through it. This reduces the number of executable file to 2×2N . For example, to change type
X to Z, the process has to change its type to Y first. Thus, transition rules allowing moving from X to Y
and, then from Y to Z are required. However, this assumes the system can hide the files that allow a
process of type Y to move into Z” context, where Z” has more privileges than Z.
7The process that decides what to expose/hide should have a notion of the permissions assigned each
process has and should next have.
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The discussion so far considers Android with only one service to protect. However,
in practice, Android offers a huge number of objects that need to be protected. We have
introduced 2N types for a single object that offer N functionalities. When a process
gets assigned a type from those types, it can access only that object with respect to the
encoded permission in the type. However, processes should be able to have access to
multiple types simultaneously. Given that a process can only have one type and rules
define a relation between types of subjects and objects. All objects must have the same
type. Therefore, the sum of all permissions offered by all objects in the system is N ′.
Considering that the number of types and rules is 2N
′
, the system could easily become




In this section, we present a few ideas on how to push current design towards the adoption
of capabilities globally. We also discuss a few modifications that are necessary to harden
the security of our design.
Global Capabilities
To support global capabilities, we have to address three challenges:
First Challenge: the first challenge would be to sandbox all processes that issue
direct system calls to the kernel (this includes system services and daemons) and only
grant them the least access rights needed. One conceivable solution would be to borrow
the concept of UNIX capabilities from Capsicum project and apply it at this low-level.
However, given the huge number of daemons and server processes, the real challenge
would be to 1) decide exactly what access rights each process needs, and 2) get to know
the system calls that have to be capability-aware.
Second Challenge: When app developers create bounded services, they normally
define permissions to protected their functionalities. Other apps willing to use this
service, have to acquire the necessary permissions. The service, in turn, would act as
a reference monitor that uses the PMS to query whether the calling process has the
required permissions or not. Although user-defined services are accessible over Binder
IPC, they are not registered in the CM. As a result, they are not supported by our design.
The flow on how processes acquire a Binder handle to a user-defined service is yet to be
discovered. If we managed to encode user-defined permissions, defined for the service,
into a mask of access rights and attach it to the Binder handle of the bounded service,
we would solve the second challenge towards applying global capabilities.
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Third Challenge: Some highly privileged processes, such as SurfaceFlinger, run in
the ”system” sandbox with UID of 1000. Such services require some functionalities from
other system services registered with the CM. System services are designed such that
they allow calls that originate from processes with specific UIDs (e.g., 1000, indicating
that it is a system process) to pass without permission check. This, in fact, is the third
challenge. One conceivable solution to this issue would be that system processes have
to identify themselves (using an identifier other than UID) when calling the CM asking
for a capability to a system service. The CM, in turn, have to maintain a static list of
access rights for each system process to all required system services. In turn, system
services will enforce access control using capabilities for all requests, including requests
from system processes.
Finally, it worth noting that, addressing the aforementioned three challenges on the
current design leads to complete abandon of UIDs. This means the ambient authority
would no longer exist.
Security Enhancements
The current design allows delegation among apps. This makes it easy for malicious app
developers to collude with other apps of her own to sabotage users privacy and security.
The solution to this problem would be to only allow delegation among processes of the
same app. We have two conceivable paths that can be implemented in the Binder driver;
First, upon capability delegation, abort the operation if the sender and receiver have two
different UIDs. Second, introduce SELinux policies and hooks in the Binder to prevent
delegation between processes of different types. The first solution is undesirable given
that we are trying to eliminate the reliance on UIDs in the system even though it might
be the easiest to implement.
Finally, although defining fine-grained access rights on system services may lead
to confusion for end users and reduce usability, it would undoubtedly improve security.
However, we can leave the Android’s permissions intact while empowering app developers
by defining more fine-grained access rights on system services which are enforced only
when the calling capability is delegated. For example, a service provides two sensitive
methods protected by a permission. In the capability mode, have performs two types
of access control. First, when a request with a capability issued by the system arrives,
it would allow execution of both methods if the first bit of access rights is set. The
second case is when a request with a delegated capability1 arrives, then it would allow
execution of both methods only if the first two bits are set. This way, the app developer
1The kernel can be extended to provide this information
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can delegate access to individual methods to other processes, which will not be able to




In this thesis, we presented our approach for supporting capabilities in Androids middle-
ware. The approach extends Androids security model with new security features and
gets the overall system a little bit closer towards applying the principle of least privilege.
The extension we have presented allows the system to work in two modes: normal
mode, and capability mode. In the capability mode, conventional high-level permission
enforcement on system services is disabled and access control based on capabilities
becomes effective. Thus, the capability mode eliminates the effect of ambient authority
and services no longer care on who is calling. Instead, they check whether the request
has the required access rights or not.
We used the Binder framework as the core building block for capabilities. Based
on that, we showed how to extend Binder handles with access rights to form fully-
fledged capabilities. Then, we illustrated how Binder capabilities are used in service
invocation, delegation, and revocation. The rationale behind using Binder handles to build
capabilities resides in the fact that Binder handles are unforgeable and communicable
tokens of authority. Those characteristics are the minimum requirements that must hold
true for capability tokens.
We further discussed how using the Binder framework limits the scope of capabilities
to only resources that are accessible through the CM. However, even with the presence
of this limitation, we managed to address two issues: The confused deputy attack, and
inclusion of malicious 3rd-party libraries. We showed how app developers need to be
more security-aware as they are given more power to limit the privileges of untrusted
components of their apps. However, we also discussed how our design aggravates the
effect of collude attack and open the door for new attack caused by implementational
limitation. Nevertheless, we presented our conception on how to prevent those attacks.
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Finally, we performed a performance analysis and showed that the overhead intro-
duced by creating capabilities is hardly observed. We further showed how the in-place
access rights check outperforms the conventional permission checking in PackageMan-
agerService. We argued whether SELinux can achieve the same objectives accomplished
by our approach and showed it might be impractical, or even infeasible, for SELinux to
do so.
In conclusion, hybrid systems (which rely on DAC, MAC, and capabilities, such as
Capsicum and our proposed design) reduce the effect of ambient authority, and show high
potential in confining sandboxes and effectively applying the principle of least privilege.
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